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This dissertation seeks to explore the core drivers of international cooperation over shared water 
courses particularly in Southern African, using the example of the Okavango River Basin as a case 
study. As a starting point it highlights the hydro-political context of Southern African, which is 
dominated by more than 21 shared water courses and faces significant challenges to its water sector 
namely through climate variability and population growth. In light of these pressing issues which 
could create a security complex for sovereign riparian states, international cooperation over trans-
boundary water sources is imperative. Drawing on core theories of international relations, this 
dissertation suggests that cooperation between riparian states is a result of strong institutional 
frameworks, at a river-basin, regional and international level. Cooperation is further reinforced 
through development functionalism which plays an important role in facilitating cooperation 
through the advancement of regional development goals and initiatives. Finally, the dissertation 
explores the role of international norms of cooperation over trans-boundary water courses and the 
important role they play in fostering cooperation. Using the case of the Okavango River Basin, the 
dissertation suggests that in Southern Africa, the strongest driver of cooperation is strong legal and 
institutional frameworks, which once established, form the basis for sustainable cooperation for 
water diplomacy between riparian states. Cooperation over the Okavango River Basin and the 
twenty years of cooperation established between Angola, Namibia and Botswana through the 
Permanent Cubango-Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) highlights an optimistic account 
for hydro-political cooperation over trans-boundary water systems between sovereign riparian 
states and provides a useful model for water basin agreements that are yet to be established. This 
thesis thus concludes that in light of the growing challenges facing the water sector in Southern 
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1. Introduction   
“Fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that water issues 
contain the seeds of violent conflict. But the water problems facing our world need not 
be only a cause of tension; they can also be a catalyst for cooperation...If all the world’s 
peoples work together, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours” 
-Kofi Annan, 20021- 
Forecasts predict that by 2025 approximately 1.8 million people around the world will be living in 
regions afflicted by absolute water scarcity2. By this time water withdrawals are also expected to 
escalate by 50 percent in developing countries, and 17 percent in developed countries, ultimately 
resulting in water-stress conditions with scarcity of renewable freshwater predicted for two-thirds of 
the world’s population3. In light of the growing scarcity of water due to climate change and 
population growth pressures, and in conjunction with increasing demands on the consumption of 
water for energy, agriculture and food, water is becoming one of the most globally important and 
valuable resources. To this extent effective governance over water is essential in order to ensure the 
sustainability of global water supplies for future generations.  
However, effective governance over water sources is complicated due to the heavy incidence of 
trans-boundary water sources that dominate the hydro-political landscape globally, with 
approximately 60% of all freshwater running across national border basins4. This heavy dominance 
of shared water courses has the potential to act as a catalyst for cooperation between riparian states 
in terms of the management of shared water courses. However, many scholars and global politicians 
have alluded to the increased potential for conflict and inter-state tension that may arise from 
varying national water plans which stand as a bulwark for international cooperation over trans-
                                                          
1 Kofi Annan, Address on ‘Water for World Development’ for the ‘World Day for Water’, 22nd March 2002.  
2 UN Water. 2009. ‘Water Statistics: Water Report’.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘The Unity of Water: Mikhail Gorbachev Urges the International Community to Get 
Serious about Governing Cross-Border Riparian Flows’, Project Syndicate. Accessed from 
http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/mikhail-gorbachev-urges-the-international-community-to-get-




boundary water courses.  This is illustrated by the relatively low number of water agreements that 
exist globally over shared water courses. It is estimated that of the 261 river basins shared between 
two or more countries, only 55 of these are governed by joint water management treaties5. 
Focusing specifically on the African continent there has been a heavy incidence of cooperation over 
shared water courses in Southern Africa. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
region, water resources are essential as they meet the basic needs of more than 260 million people 
in the region, as well as sustaining a wealth of diverse ecosystems that are essential not only for its 
population, but its biodiversity6. Within the SADC region there are 12 mainland states which are 
connected by 21 river basins that traverse national borders, of which 15 are highly significant for 
socio-economic development7. These river basins cover 70% of the land area in the SADC region8. In 
addition estimates suggest that approximately 70% of the region’s fresh water resources are shared 
between two or more member states9. This heavy incidence of trans-boundary water sources has 
resulted in a number of international water basin agreements between various members within the 
SADC region. Of particular significance is The Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission 
(OKACOM) which celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2014. Twenty years of sustained cooperation 
between Angola, Namibia and Botswana is an impressive feat and one that needs to be 
acknowledged, analysed and understood within the framework of International Relations in order to 
encourage cooperation over trans-boundary water courses in other regions where water 
agreements have yet to be established. The Nile River Basin is one such example where there has 
been a distinct lack of riparian cooperation and political will. As such an overarching joint water 
                                                          
5 The Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM), ‘Fact Sheet for the Cubnago-Okavango River 
Basin’, OKACOM Landing Page. Available at: http://www.okacom.org/okavango-fact-sheet/okavango-facts-
4/view Date accessed: 14th September 2014.  
6 Regional Strategic Action Plan on Integrated Water Resources Development & Management (2011-2015). 
SADC, pp. 1.  
7 Turton, A. 2010. ‘New Thinking on the Governance of Water and River Basins in Africa: Lessons from the 
SADC Region’, SAIIA Research Report, no. 6, pp. 8.  
8Stephan, H & Bridgeman, M. 2012. Regionalism and the Water Sector in Southern Africa’, The Scramble for 
Africa in the 21st Century: From the Old World to the New. Cape Town: Renaissance Press, pp346. 




management agreement has yet to be formalised between the ten riparian states over this 
important shared water system. This has resulted in an escalation of certain tensions between 
states, most notably between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. 
In light of the growing pressures that result in water insecurity globally, and especially within 
Southern Africa, it is important to gain an understanding into cooperation over shared water courses 
and what drives international cooperation over trans-boundary water sources, particularly in regions 
where water scarcity is rife. The importance of gaining this insight may help to ensure that 
cooperation between states over watercourses can be fostered where water basin agreements have 
not yet been established and help to preserve those agreements that have already been established.  
1.1 Overview of the Literature: Our State of Knowledge  
Within the realm of International Relations and Environmental and Development Studies, a well-
established link between resource scarcity, poor governance of resources and conflict has emerged, 
resulting in the conventional wisdom that there is a directly proportional relationship between 
resource scarcity and conflict10. Water, like many other non-renewable resources, has been posited 
as yet another finite, and in some instances notably scarce, resource which has been linked to local, 
intra-state and inter-state conflict. The focus of this dissertation and the literature explored will be 
on international conflict and cooperation, as opposed to localised tensions.  
Water is an absolutely essential resource for human existence and survival with an increasing variety 
of often conflicting demands on its usage. It fluctuates both in time and space, often running 
contrary to political boundaries. As a result of water’s diverse uses, its trans-boundary flow, and its 
importance for human life, there exists a vast expanse of literature which explores the governance 
of water and the inextricable link between water and politics. This literature review will seek to 
explore the development of the literature on water governance, insecurity, and the cooperation and 
conflict dichotomy. It will highlight early streams of thought within the literature which centred 
                                                          




around the idea of water wars; and thereafter explore more recent literature which has advocated 
for the more likely incidence of cooperation over water as opposed to conflict. Finally this review will 
conclude by focusing on the water-food-energy-climate nexus and the increased focus on and 
imperative for cooperation in light of the growing challenges of climate change and population 
growth.   
Early literature and ‘water wars’  
There exists a vast expanse of literature which explores the topic of water insecurity and conflict. 
From the late 1980s towards the end of the 20th century, scholars were increasingly preoccupied 
with the idea of ‘water wars’ where the central argument pivoted around the belief that the next 
world war would be fought over water. This is in contrast to widespread belief in the 1950s which 
asserted that water was a source for peace and development, whilst oil was associated as the 
leading cause of resource-based conflict11. Towards the end of the 20th century scholars like John 
Cooley (1984), Arthur H. Westing (1986), Joyce Starr (1991), Wilfried Remans (1995) and Leif Ohlsson 
amongst others12, posited that water was not only a historic factor for conflict, but extrapolated it as 
“the resource” which could result in war in the 21st century, based on the premise that “competition 
for limited…freshwater…[would lead] to severe political tensions and even to war”13. As World Bank 
Vice-president Ismail Serageldin asserted, “the wars of the next century will be about water”14.  
The argument for water as the most likely renewable source of political tension and conflict was 
based on evidence from numerous case studies examined that were found predominantly in the 
Middle East, with the Jordan and Nile rivers as examples, along with other cases scattered 
                                                          
11 Wescoat, James L., Jr.1992. "Resource management: oil resources and the gulf conflict," Progress in Human 
Geography vol.16, no. 2, pp. 243-256. 
12 Cooley, J. K. 1984. ‘The war over water’, Foreign Policy, 3-26.  Starr, J. R. 1991. ‘Water wars’, Foreign policy, 
17-36.  Starr, J. R. (1991). Water wars. Foreign policy, 17-36. Remans, W. 1995. ‘Water and War’, Humanitaires 
Volkerrecht. Vol. 8, no.1.; Ohlsson, L. 1999. Environment, Scarcity and Conflict: A Study of Malthusian 
Concerns. Department of Peace and Development Research. University of Göteborg. 
13 Westing, A. H. 1986. ‘Global Resources and International Conflict’, International Journal on World Peace. Vol. 
4, no. 4, pp. 110-112.  




throughout South Asia and South America found in the work of Peter Gleick (1993), Thomas F. 
Homer-Dixon (1994), Wilfried Remans (1995), Paul Samson and Bertrand Charrier (1997), Kent Butts 
(1997), Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001) and Kathryn Furlong, N. P.Gleditsch ,Harvard 
Hegre, Bethany Ann Lacina and Taylor Owen (2006)15. Many of these studies which have highlighted 
the link between water and conflict have been empirical in their frameworks and have been 
extensively global in their scope, using numerous case studies for comparisons that are extrapolated 
to a general and international level.  
 The core argument for water wars was built on the fact that water, as a vital resource for a nation’s 
survival - both in terms of human security of its inhabitants survival to its economy - in arid and 
semi-arid environments, would create intense political pressure and a subsequent condition of 
‘water stress’16, especially when shared between two or more riparian states. The literature on 
water and conflict ultimately draws out two main factors for conflict, which may act in unison or 
create tension in isolation:  
The first being water scarcity, which fits neatly into the above-mentioned conventional wisdom that 
resource scarcity is directly related to increased conflict. Scholars like, Hendrix and Glaser (2007) as 
well as Diana Glassman, Michele Wucker, Tanushree Isaacman & Corinne Champilou (2011) have 
further reinforced the work of early scholars in this field by focusing on water-related conflict that 
has arisen from water scarcity as a result of climate variability, population growth, increased 
                                                          
15 Gleick, Peter, "Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security, " International Security 
vol.1, no.1, Summer 1993, pp.79-112.; Homer-Dixon, Thomas F, "Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: 
evidence from cases," International Security, vol. 19, Summer 1994, pp. 5-40.; Samson, Paul, and Bertrand 
Charrier, International freshwater conflict: issues and prevention strategies, Green Cross, 1997. Draft Report.; 
Butts, Kent, "The strategic importance of water," Parameters , Spring 1997,pp.65-83.; Paul, F. Diehl & Nils 
Petter Gleditsch (eds.), 2001. Environmental Conflict: An Anthology. Colorado, Westview Press, pp. 1-352.  
16 The term ‘water stress’ was initially coined by Malin Fallenmark, to be used in conjunction with his 
‘Fallenmark Index’ to measure water scarcity. See Fallenmark, M. 1989. "The massive water scarcity now 




demand for water from industrial sectors and often the mismanagement of resources17. The growing 
tensions over water as a result of climate change and urbanisation have ensured that the topic of 
water diplomacy has remained relevant and important, specifically with regard to ensuring that 
cooperative efforts supersede conflict.  
Trans-boundary water courses as a source of conflict  
A second cause of water conflict which has emerged in more recent literature is the trans-boundary 
nature of certain water systems. With a more regional focus, scholars like Anthony Turton, Peter 
Ashton, Aaron Wolf and Tamiru Abiye throughout their extensive research, have suggested that 
tension over shared water courses may emerge as a result of disagreements as to their equitable 
division among upstream and downstream riparian states. Abiye (2014) suggest that tensions here 
may arise purely as a result of a lack of political will to cooperate, with states unwilling to cede their 
sovereign and ‘riparian right’. Scholars who have emphasized the importance of trans-boundary 
water systems in the water-conflict paradigm have focused on conflict resulting from poor 
governance of shared water sources and a lack of political will to cooperate with other riparian 
states to ensure sustainable usage of trans-boundary watercourses.  
An important contribution to this stream of thought within the literature pivots around the Security 
Complex Theory, as put forward by scholars like Barry Buzan (1991, 1998) and Michael Schulz 
(1995)18. Using the Security Complex Theory, scholars suggest that if trans-boundary water courses 
are inherently linked to riparian states’ national security concerns (human and economic) and issues 
of high politics, securitization of water resource management could result. Securitization of water 
ultimately entails the unwillingness of riparian states to cooperate, whether it is through the 
                                                          
17Glassman, D., Wucker, M., Isaacman, T. & Champilou, C. 2011. ‘The Water-Energy Nexus: Adding Water to 
the Energy Agenda’,World Policy Institute.   
18 Buzan, B. 1991. People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. ; Buzan, B., Waever, O. & de Wilde, J. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
London: Lynne Rienner.; Schulz, M. 1995. ‘Turkey, Syria and Iraq: A Hydro-political Security Complex’, in 




absence of water usage and development agreements, or the reluctance to share important 
hydrological data and information. This has been seen predominantly in the Middle East North Africa 
(MENA) region as explored by scholars like Ann Mosely Lesch (1992), Jeroen Warner (1996) & John 
Anthony Allan (2000)19.  The securitization debate over water resource management calls to mind 
Robert Putnam’s two level-game theory (1988), which in turn becomes pertinent to the debate on 
water insecurity, conflict and cooperation, as states have to carefully choose between national 
pressures and interests that may not be in alignment on a regional level with other riparian states20. 
It is important to highlight these distinctions in causes of water conflicts so as to avoid painting the 
problem of water insecurity and conflict with one broad brushstroke that neglects, and is insensitive, 
to a variety of complex factors. Africa has been a particularly pertinent example on a regional level 
due to the large number of trans-boundary water sources that exist. The large presence of cross-
border water systems on the African continent is due to the legacy of colonialism that saw the 
creation of artificial borders running contrary to natural water sources and ethnic ties21. Regions 
which have been dominant in this area of the literature have been North and East Africa, with on-
going conflict and tensions pertaining to the usage of the Nile River Basin between its dependent 
riparian states: Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Southern Africa has also become a particularly pertinent 
example in the literature on water insecurity and conflict, especially as it contains 21 trans-boundary 
water sources, covering approximately 70% of the country’s land22. The focus on the Southern 
African region is of particular importance as it combines a hydro-political landscape which is 
dominated by trans-boundary water systems, as well as being a particularly water-stressed region, 
                                                          
19 Lesch, A.M. 1992. Transition to Palestinian Self-Government. Report of a Study Group of the Middle East 
Programme Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 
MA: Published in collaboration with Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.; Warner, J. 1996. 
De drooglegging van de Jordaanvallei, in Transaktie, Vol. 25, No. 3; 363-379.; Allan, J.A. 2000. The Middle East 
Water Question: Hydro-politics and the Global Economy. London: IB Tauris. ;  
20 Putnam, R. D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." International 
organization 42.03 (1988): 427-460. 
21 Stephan, H. & Bridgeman, M. 2012. ‘Regionalism and the Water Sector in Southern Africa’, The Scramble for 
Africa: In the 21st Century From the Old World to the New. Cape Town: Renaissance Press. Pp. 345.  




which has historically culminated in certain tensions between riparian users, as was seen in the early 
1990s over the Okavango River Basin running through Botswana, Angola and Namibia23.  
The ‘conflict vs. cooperation dichotomy’  
Whilst early literature posited that conflict over water was inevitable and ever “looming”24, based on 
historical evidence and the ever-increasing threats of climate change and urbanisation, scholars have 
recently begun to move away from this mind-set and are becoming increasingly focused on the 
potential for water to act as a catalyst for cooperation. Heavyweight scholars within the field of 
hydro-politics like Turton, Wolf and Ashton have shown through their research that cooperation 
over trans-boundary watercourses is a far more likely outcome than conflict.  They counter the 
arguments of scholars like Schulz and Buzan, who argue for the ultimate securitization of water 
resource management, as they suggest that cooperation is the “only way” for water resource 
management25. Scholars like Wolf, Turton and Ashton throughout their research have shown that 
cooperation is an achievable and ultimately inevitable outcome of water governance. In addition 
they suggest that the incidence of water conflict resolution is in fact much higher than the outbreak 
of conflict over water and refute the argument that water wars are inevitable, especially when based 
on the disingenuous extrapolation of historical evidence alone. These scholars have shown through 
various case studies that cooperation can in part be achieved and sustained through the 
institutionalisation of cooperation through ‘water regimes’ which once they have been established, 
become resilient to breaking down. In addition they highlight the importance of international and 
regional legal frameworks which provide guidelines for riparian users on the joint management of 
trans-boundary water systems.  
 
                                                          
23 Ashton, P. 2003. ‘Southern African Water Conflicts: Are they inevitable or preventable?’, The Water Wheel. 
Pp.2.   
24 Ashton, P. 2003. ‘Southern African Water Conflicts: Are they inevitable or preventable?’, The Water Wheel.  




The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus  
The debate over the conflict-cooperation dichotomy has become even more pertinent in recent 
years with the development of the discourse surrounding the ‘water-food-energy-climate’ nexus. 
The Bonn2011 Conference on ‘Water, Energy and Food Security Nexus’ cemented the importance of 
this nexus within the realm of natural resource governance26. This nexus ultimately suggests that 
water, food, energy and climate change are inherently linked to one another and therefore 
promotes sustainable development and usage of water in order to secure the demands on water 
from the food and energy sectors, particularly in light of the growing challenges presented by 
climate variability27. With the world’s population reaching almost 8 billion in total, and with greater 
demands for food and energy to support greater expectations for improved living standards, the 
focus on water governance and management between riparian states has been reignited. Whilst 
recent scholars have suggested it is disingenuous to suppose that ‘water wars’ will be inevitable 
based on historical incidences of conflict over water, the unprecedented levels of demand on the 
world’s decreasing clean water supplies have caused scholars to rethink the possibility and potential 
increase in tensions over water.  The growing importance of water within this nexus is the crux of 
this dissertation’s aim. While there have been some attempts to understand cooperation in 
Southern Africa given the high levels of water scarcity, it would seem that there is room to develop 
on the literature to gain a full understanding of what drives cooperation, particularly in light of the 
challenges of climate change, population growth and increased demand for water for energy 
production. This research project wishes to reignite the focus and reinforce the importance of 
cooperation especially with the increasing pressures facing global water sector today. In doing so 
this paper seeks to explore the core drivers of cooperation in order to assist riparian states in 
establishing cooperation or enhancing already established cooperative efforts.   
                                                          
26 Hoff, Holger (2011). ‘Understanding the Nexus.’ Background Paper for the Bonn2011 Conference: The 
Water, Energy and Food Security Nexus. Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm. 
 





1.2 Research Aim & Question  
In light of the literature that exists surrounding the topic of water insecurity and cooperation 
particularly within Southern Africa, this research paper will seek to understand what drives 
international cooperation over trans-boundary water sources, drawing on the experience of the case 
study of the Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) and its water agreement 
which governs the joint management of the Cubango-Okavango River Basin, flowing through Angola, 
Namibia and Botswana. This dissertation will subsequently strive to contribute to the literature on 
water scarcity and international cooperation by examining the drivers of cooperation in the case of 
OKACOM and relating it to various theories of international relations, including regional 
development integration (development functionalism), neoliberal institutionalism, and norms theory 
within a constructivist approach.  In doing so this dissertation will attempt to answer the following 
explanatory research question: What drives cooperation over trans-boundary water sources in 
Southern Africa? In conclusion this dissertation will seek to provide recommendations for this 
cooperation to be sustained.  
1.3 Research Design & Methodology  
In order to gain an understanding into the high levels of riparian cooperation in Southern Africa this 
dissertation will take the form of an explanatory analysis, using theories of International Relations 
coupled with case-specific information to explain the core drivers of this cooperation.  In addition to 
this, and to aid this explanatory analysis, this thesis will analyse the various policies that exist at the 
international level, regional and local level, namely the UN Water Convention; SADC’s PSWS and 
RSAP strategies; as well as OKACOM’s own river basin agreement.  This dissertation will seek to 
descriptively highlight water pressures in the SADC region in general, in relation to the food-energy-
climate nexus, and how these pressures can result in potential inter-state tensions over cooperation 




Thereafter, this contribution will make use of existing literature which explores the relationship 
between conflict and water insecurity in the SADC region, in order to gain an understanding into the 
common factors which drive cooperation in the region. Thereafter this work will delve specifically 
into the case of the Okavango River Basin to highlight and further expand on the drivers of 
cooperation over trans-boundary water courses in the SADC region.  Primary sources of water 
agreements and policy strategies in conjunction with information, data and statistics on the 
Cubango-Okavango River Basin will be used to aid in this explanatory analysis. Finally, informal 
interviews with specialists in the field of hydro-politics will be conducted in order to gain more 
insight into what drives international cooperation over shared water courses in light of increasing 
pressures resulting in water insecurity in the region. 
1.4 Relevance of Study  
2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of the ratification of OKACOM agreement which governs the 
management of the Okavango River which runs through Angola, Namibia and Botswana. Before the 
agreement was reached in 1994, there existed a large degree of tension between these three 
riparian states as to the use and governance over this water basin which spans 1,100km. However, 
with extensive negotiations these three countries successfully formulated an agreement over the 
governance of the Okavango River. Like the numerous other water basin agreements that exist in 
the SADC region, OKACOM is a valuable example of the ability of riparian states to use trans-
boundary water courses as a means for cooperation, as opposed to conflict. It is therefore important 
to gain an understanding of the drivers of international cooperation over shared water courses so 
that these lessons can potentially be applied to other regions where international water agreements 
have yet to be established and where the threat of conflict over water continues to loom. In addition 
the pressures on water are more significant than they were twenty years ago with the added 
challenges presented by climate change and the increased demand for water posed in the water-




diplomacy has become increasingly acknowledged as essential for enduring peace and sustained 
economic growth and improved human development. To this extent, and with the growing 
pressures facing global water resources, it is important that scholars and world leaders attempt to 
understand the ways in which cooperation over shared water courses can be achieved in such a way 
that respective national interests and the sovereignty of riparian states are respected.  
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation  
This dissertation will commence with an explanatory section which will highlight and conceptualise 
important themes and concepts to be dealt with in the dissertation. These include concepts such as 
cooperation, water insecurity and governance to name but a few. In addition this section will also 
highlight the hydro-political context of southern Africa, highlighting the various increasing pressures 
(climate change, population growth, and energy demand) its water sector faces, therefore 
illustrating the necessity for cooperation between riparian states as water insecurity rises.  
After defining important concepts and providing an overview of the geographical and hydro-political 
context of the southern African region, this dissertation will delve into already-established theories 
of cooperation over shared water courses, focusing specifically on development functionalism; 
neoliberal institutionalism (including the importance of political will and trust); and norms within a 
constructivist approach . This section will also provide a critique on these theories, highlighting 
certain limits to these theories of cooperation over water resource management.  
Thereafter this paper will delve into the crux of the analysis, using the case study of the Okavango 
River Basin to highlight which theories can most effectively explain the drivers of cooperation in the 
Southern African region and expand on our existing knowledge of what fuels international 
cooperation.  This section will highlight the history of the Permanent Cubango-Okavango River Basin 
Commission (OKACOM), its origins, its current policies and joint management strategies and will use 
the case of OKACOM to bridge the divide between the theoretical and the practical realm in order to 




20th anniversary of water cooperation over the Cubango-Okavango River Basin, to provide 
recommendations for how international cooperation over shared water basins can be sustained in 
the future.  
Finally, this dissertation will draw upon the main arguments made in the paper, highlighting the core 
drivers of international cooperation over trans-boundary water courses in theory and in practice 
using the case of the Cubango-Okavango River Basin and will draw conclusions as to how 







2. Overview of concepts and the hydro-
political context of the Southern African 
region  
Before delving into an explanatory analysis of international cooperation over shared courses in the 
Southern Africa region, particularly focusing on the case of the Cubango-Okavango River Basin, it is 
imperative that important core concepts that will be dealt with in this dissertation are 
conceptualised and expounded upon. These core concepts include ‘water insecurity’, ‘cooperation’, 
and ‘governance’.  In addition it is important that an overview of the hydro-political context of 
Southern Africa and the challenges it faces are explored.  
Concepts 
 
Water Scarcity & Security 
As a result of population growth and the subsequent increase in demand for water, food and energy, 
in conjunction with the alterations in hydrological balances caused by climate variability, water 
scarcity is becoming a significant global issue. According to the World Economic Forum, water 
scarcity is currently ranked as the third most concerning global risk28. Estimates suggest that by 2030 
between 75 million and 250 million people in Africa will be dwelling in regions in which there is a 
high degree of water stress, potentially resulting in the displacement of up to 700 million people29.  
In light of the fact that water scarcity and security is becoming a significant global risk, it is important 
to accurately conceptualise just what is meant by water insecurity as a result of scarcity. In defining 
water insecurity, it is perhaps most useful to define it in terms of its inverse, namely ‘water security’. 
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Water security is defined by United Nations Water Convention as “the capacity of a population to 
safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable water for sustaining livelihoods, 
human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne 
pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and 
political stability”30. This is corroborated by David Grey and Claudia Sadoff (2007) who suggest that 
water security is an “availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, 
livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to 
people, environments and economies”31. Water security also encompasses “complex and 
interconnected challenges” that pivot around the sustainable management of water in order to 
achieve a greater sense of security for states, as well as a high degree of sustainability of water 
sources and the usage thereof, in order to achieve greater levels of development and enhance the 
well-being and livelihoods of all peoples32. There are a number of factors and sectors which 
contribute to water security. These range from natural to infrastructural factors, as well as 
institutional, political, social and financial spheres, which all to some extent are intricately linked to 
the sustainable management of water. As such ensuring a state of water security necessitates cross-
sectoral collaboration which extends across all levels of society at a national level and across 
internationally marked borders.  
Water insecurity can therefore be conceptualised as a situation whereby there is a lack of adequate 
quantity and poor quality of water that threatens the well-being and livelihoods of citizens, 
environments and economies.  
 
 
                                                          
30 UN-Water, 2013. Available at: http://www.unwater.org/topics/water-security/en/ . Date Accessed: 17th 
October 2014.  
31 Grey, D. & Sadoff, C. W. 2007. ‘Sink or swim? Water security for growth and development’, Water Policy. 
Volume 9, pp. 545-571.  





As identified in the review of the literature, water has, throughout history, been a source of tensions 
and even conflict between its usage and its users, especially in cases where water systems traverse 
sovereign boundaries. As water is becoming increasingly scarce, resulting in water insecurity 
becoming a globally pressing risk, there are emerging concerns that trans-boundary water courses 
have the potential to become a serious cause of tensions between sovereign riparian states, in turn 
impairing socio-economic development. Conversely, there is a budding consensus that trans-
boundary water courses can act as catalysts for peace and cooperation, which in turn can support 
regional integration, drive economic growth and the sustainability of regional water security33. In 
order to effectively contribute to the debate on trans-boundary water courses and their potential for 
cooperation over conflict and in order to understand what drives cooperation, it is important to 
garner an understanding of what is meant by cooperation.  
Cooperation is a notoriously complex concept which is regarded differently depending on the 
various fields of academia under review. In terms of natural resource governance there are various 
conceptions of what cooperation entails. According to scholars like Aaron Wolf, Shira Yoffe and Mark 
Girodano (2003), the "pinnacle of cooperation" is the formulation of international agreements and 
treaties34.  However, other scholars like Elizabeth Kistin (2007) have suggested that cooperation 
should be conceptualised beyond the establishment of treaties and should be understood as a 
dynamic, "on-going" and "non-linear" process in which states and non-state actors "establish, 
challenge, modify, and legitimise multi-layered governance structures"35.  It is suggested that some 
degree of tensions are necessary in the negotiation process to achieve "real" cooperation, as often 
treaties, while striving for the advancement of human and ecological security often are established 
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to achieve national development agendas36. Scholars like Robert Falkner (2003) have suggested that 
cooperation goes even further in that it requires the "adjustment of individual behaviour to achieve 
mutually beneficial objectives"37.  
This often makes cooperation particularly difficult to achieve as sovereign states ultimately have to 
engage, in what Robert Putnam famously termed, a 'two-level game'38. States playing Putnam's two-
level game have to effectively balance national duties and pressures in order to garner continued 
political support from domestic constituencies; whilst at the same time adhering to international 
obligations that may oftentimes be in conflict with domestic pressures and agendas. Cooperation 
becomes particularly elusive in situations where the gains of shared resources are asymmetrically 
distributed between sovereign riparian states, often resulting in competitive as opposed to 
cooperative behaviour between riparian states.   
This raises another interesting aspect of cooperation: the degree of cooperation. The extent of 
cooperation is important and often contested among scholars with some asserting that even slight 
cooperation can be classified as cooperation. As the 2006 UN Development Report stated, 
"cooperation over trans-boundary waters, need not always be deep - in the sense of agreeing to 
share all resources and engaging in all types of cooperative ventures - for states to derive benefits 
from rivers and lakes. Indeed, given the strategic political and economic contexts in international 
basins, it makes sense to promote and support cooperation of any sort, no matter how slight"39. This 
dissertation will not deal specifically with the degree of cooperation through the identification of 
cooperation based on established scales and criteria. Rather this dissertation will adopt Mark 
Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi's (2008) argument that cooperation and conflict should not be treated 
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as two dichotomous concepts on a single spectrum. Rather Zeitoun and Mirumachi suggest that 
cooperation should actually be re-conceptualised as "interaction", where there exists 'negative 
interaction', 'neutral interaction' and 'positive interaction', accurately accounting for the complex 
realm in which political decisions and strategies are taken by sovereign states that are often in 
competition with one another. Zeitoun and Mirumachi's conception of 'positive interaction' will form 
the basis for this paper's conceptualisation of cooperation. According to Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 
'positive interaction' entails cooperation which is based on equal footing, spanning a range of issues 
where disagreements and tensions are minimized through planned procedures, negotiations, 
treaties and trans-boundary water regimes and organisations as well as benefit- and information-
sharing mechanisms and platforms40. 
Cooperation in light of trans-boundary water courses and regional integration shall therefore be 
conceptualised in this paper as the political willingness of sovereign states to coordinate and 
harmonise their national policies pertaining to shared water systems through the establishment of  
various processes, negotiations, treaties, organisations and mechanisms which seek to share 
information and benefits of the shared water system. Ultimately cooperation over trans-boundary 
water sources in this dissertation refers to the creation of a shared vision, which goes beyond 
national development agendas and seeks to create mutual benefits for all riparian states.  
Water Governance  
Achieving water security through the development and management of water resources remains 
pivotal for economic growth, sustainable development and the reduction of poverty, particularly 
within the framework of the 2015 UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include 
poverty and hunger reduction, the lowering of child mortality rates, ameliorating maternal health, 
combating HIV/AIDS and malaria, ensuring environmental sustainability, and establishing global 
partnerships for development, all of which to some extent centre around minimizing water scarcity 
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on a global and regional level through joint governance and management. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), water security and the emerging 
global water crisis is predominantly “a governance crisis”41.  
Water governance, as shall be conceptualised in this dissertation will refer to political, social, 
economic and administrative systems established to effectively develop and manage water 
resources at a national and international level across a multitude of sectors42. Water governance 
includes awareness and communication; education and capacity building; research and 
developmental stakeholder participation; and advocacy for water.  
Governance also includes management strategies and policies that seek to better manage natural 
resources. Governance in relation to trans-boundary water systems includes the concept of 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), which is ultimately is the embodiment of a 
harmonisation of national policies and development agendas over shared water courses between 
riparian states.  
 
Overview of hydro-political context of Southern Africa 
 
“More than any other resource, water perhaps best demonstrates the idea of Southern Africa as a 
region rather than a collection of autonomous states demarcated by arbitrary boundaries” 
Harry Stephan & Michael Bridgman 
Trans-boundary Water Systems in Southern Africa 
Trans-boundary water courses dominate the hydro-political landscape of Southern Africa, and Africa 
at large. At a continental level Africa has 64 river basins that traverse across international political 
borders. This is due in part to Africa's colonial legacy which resulted in the demarcation of artificial 
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Figure 1: Major River Basins in SADC region.  
 
international political boundaries across ethnicities and hydrological systems, to suit the desires and 
pursuits of colonial powers43. Southern Africa’s hydro-political geography is dominated by a large 
number of trans-boundary water systems that flow between twelve very unique countries, 
characterised by different development trajectories, political legacies, legal systems and a diverse 
set of natural resources44. As mentioned previously there are 21 river basins which link the 12 inland 
states subsumed within the SADC region. Of these, 15 are considered to be of extreme importance 
for economic 
development, as a large 
number of them fall 
within the four most 
economically prosperous 
nations, namely South 
Africa, Namibia, Angola 
and Zambia45.  
Approximately 70% of 
the region’s fresh water 
resources are shared 
between two or more SADC member states46. This is illustrated in Figure 1 alongside.  Despite the 
heavy incidence of 21 trans-boundary water courses in Southern Africa, there exist only 9 formally 
established water basin agreements that seek to ensure cooperation between riparian states and 
the harmonisation of their national water policies. These water basin agreements include the Inco-
Maputo Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee (TPTC), which governs the Incomati and Maputo 
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Rivers running through South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland; the International Commission of 
Congo-Oubangui-Sangha (CICOS), which governs the Congo River and its tributaries through the 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic  (CAR) and the 
Republic of Congo; the Kunene Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC) which presides over the 
Kunene River Basin through Angola and Namibia; the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA),over Lake 
Tanganyika Basin through Burundi, DRC, Tanzania and Zambia; the Limpopo Water Course 
Commission (LIMCOM), which governs the Limpopo River, one of the largest  river basins in the SADC 
region, which runs through Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and South Africa; the Orange-Senqu 
River Commission (ORASECOM), which governs the Orange and Senqu rivers through Botswana, 
South Africa and Namibia; the Permanent Cubango-Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM), 
which jointly manages the Okavango River basin which runs through Angola, Namibia and Botswana; 
the Ruvuma Joint Water Commission (Ruvuma JWC), which governs the Rovuma/Ruvuma River Basin 
running through the United Republic of Tanzania and Mozambique; and finally the Zambezi 
Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM), which presides over the Zambezi River connecting eight 
Southern African riparian countries.  
This dissertation will be focusing specifically on cooperation over the Okavango River Basin between 
Angola, Namibia and Botswana through the Permanent Cubango-Okavango River Basin Commission 
(OKACOM). OKACOM and the hydro-political context of the Okavango River Basin will be discussed 
after a thorough understanding of the hydro-political context of Southern Africa has been 
established.  
Due to the heavy incidence of trans-boundary water systems that characterise the hydro-political 
landscape of Southern Africa, joint management over shared river basins has become particularly 
important, especially as not all river basins garner equal benefits to riparian states in terms of the 
sustainability of local livelihoods and economic gains rendered47. This is further intensified by the 
                                                          




fact that the trans-boundary water sources in the region fall between the Inter-Tropical Convergence 
Zone and the Southern Ocean, which act as the drivers of different weather and precipitation trends.  
Water Scarcity & Water-Stressed States in Southern Africa  
Southern Africa is a particularly interesting region to examine in terms of cooperation over trans-
boundary water sources as it consists of the greatest number of water-stressed nations in any other 
region in the world, with 40% of the region’s population unable to access clean and safe water with 
which to meet their basic human needs and proper sanitation48. This lack of safe drinking water has 
significant health and socio-economic implications with high rates of illness and death caused by 
poor and unsafe water quality as well as water-borne diseases. The increased risk of mortality arising 
from illnesses like cholera, keeps children away from school, hindering their education, and 
preventing members of the family from pursing more economically productive activities whilst they 
care for their sick relatives49. Challenges of water scarcity, sanitation and hygiene have become 
increasingly pertinent issues that need to be addressed particularly in light of global development 
targets that have been set to be attained in the next decade, as can be seen in global development 
agendas like the UN 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) of which development of water resources for ensuring water security is essential50.  
 When one considers the high levels of water scarcity in conjunction with the heavy incidence of 
trans-boundary water sources that make up the hydro-political landscape of Southern Africa, it 
becomes clear that cooperation is a necessary requirement for effective governance and 
management of its regional waterscape as water is “the nexus of Africa’s development challenges”51. 
Water resources in Southern Africa are crucial for sustaining the regions rich biodiversity, as well as 
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meeting the needs of fourteen sovereign states and the 260 million people therein52. This need for 
cooperation will become even more crucial as climate variability, population dynamics, and poverty 
levels continue to grow.   
Water & Climate Change in the SADC Region 
According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Southern Africa region is 
particularly susceptible to climate change. Generally, the climate changes anticipated for Southern 
Africa are similar to those being experienced on a global level. Over the last few decades 
temperatures in the region have gradually been on the rise. According to the IPCC temperatures in 
the region have risen by over 0.5°C over the last 100 years53. Based on future climate modelling 
findings, it is projected that the region’s climate will continue to become hotter and drier with mean 
temperature increases between 1°C and 3°C by 208054. In addition Southern Africa has also 
experienced a downward trend in rainfall, exemplified in rainfall that is below normal with more 
frequent spells of drought. Patterns of precipitation have also been forecast to change in their 
intensity and frequency, resulting in more extreme events of flooding and even more prolonged 
periods between rainfalls55. 
Water is perhaps the most prominent resource through which the impacts of climate change take 
effect as global warming transforms hydrological patterns which determine the availability and 
quality of water. Climate change can therefore be seen as a “threat multiplier”, aggravating already-
existing threats on fresh water resources and the management thereof, as climate change increases 
water stress in arid areas as well as undermining the water quality in areas which have experienced 
flooding. According to evidence found by the IPCC, the overall effect of climate change on global 
water resources and freshwater ecosystems will be negative as a result of the decreased quantity 
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and quality of available water56. Climate change has already begun changing the geographic 
distribution, frequency and intensity of water-related hazards which threaten to undermine the 
resilience of poorer developing countries and their citizens to absorb loss and recover from disaster 
impacts57. In Southern Africa as average temperatures rise, the water cycle is being adversely 
affected by increased evaporation and changing precipitation patterns. In the region flooding is on 
the increase as more intense and frequent storms are being experienced. Climate-related floods 
pose a serious threat to national economies and sustainable development. At the same time water 
scarcity is also intensified through disrupted rainfall patterns, increased evaporation loss and 
increased water demand across all sectors. In its fifth assessment report, the IPCC alluded to a 90% 
probability that the extent of drought-affected areas will increase58.  These climatic changes will also 
have serious adverse socio-economic impacts for societies and economies in Southern Africa, 
affecting key sectors such as water, agriculture, tourism, mining and energy. There are also 
significant adverse effects to health which are linked to climate change in Southern Africa including 
an increase in water-borne diseases and malaria where it is otherwise uncommon59.  
Due to the serious and often adverse effects of climate change throughout Southern Africa, joint 
water resource management strategies should integrate climate change adaptation into their 
policies to ensure that important ecosystems become less vulnerable to climate changes as well as 
to improve climate resilience in the region60. In addition cooperative efforts are essential over 
shared water courses in order to mitigate the effects of climate change so as to avoid further 
negative impacts from affecting the region’s water sector and future development.  
Population Dynamics in Southern Africa 
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Population growth in Southern Africa is increasing steadily at a rate of 2.7% per annum61. Increasing 
population dynamics necessarily warrant an increase in the demand for goods and services, placing 
increasing pressure on the water sector as a key sector for the production of agriculture and energy. 
Increased urbanisation will also increase demands for water-based goods and services as standards 
of living improve and as an increasing proportion of citizens migrate to urban areas. It is expected 
that water for energy production will increase by 50% globally by 2035 along with a global 70% 
expected increases in food demand by 205062. While these are global estimates, it is clear that the 
demand for water will no doubt increase drastically in the next few decades, ultimately reinforcing 
the importance of cooperative water resource management. To deal with increasing pressures of 
population growth, it is essential that joint water management strategies over trans-boundary water 
systems are established in order to ensure that mechanisms are implemented to effectively manage 
these pressures and minimize the effects of diminishing water sources with growing populations.  
Poverty in Southern Africa & Water for Socio-Economic Development 
“Not only does water sustain life, it is an engine and catalyst for social-economic development” 
Dr. Tomáz Augusto Salamão, Executive Secretary of SADC 
In Southern Africa today, approximately half the population lives on less than US $1/day, reinforcing 
the fact that poverty remains one of the region’s most serious and significant challenges63. Many 
rural populations depend on river basins running across national borders for their livelihood as water 
is consumed for drinking and food, for farming and agricultural needs, for livestock grazing, for 
building materials and for important medicinal plants. To ensure that this important resource is 
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preserved for their well-being and livelihoods, as well as ensuring that the benefits do not shift away 
from the rural poor to those in higher income segments of society, it is essential that water-based 
development initiatives are correctly managed and do not deplete water resources in the region. 
With heavy emphasis placed on reducing poverty by half within the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), it is essential that cooperation over trans-boundary water courses within the SADC region, 
is established in order to ensure that poverty levels of rural communities will not be subject to 
deterioration and to ensure that the ecological integrity of water courses is preserved for future 
socio-economic benefits to enrich the lives of those rural communities.  
Water is a particularly important source of economic development as it is pivotal to boosting 
national economic development and reducing national poverty levels. This once again underscores 
the importance of cooperation between riparian states and the harmonisation of national policies 
and joint management strategies over trans-boundary water courses which must be prioritised.  
Some scholars have gone so far as to say that the overall economic potential of the SADC region 
rests largely on and is determined by the availability of water64.This argument, which suggests that 
water is of utmost importance to the SADC region from a developmental perspective, is premised on 
the knowledge that the majority of SADC countries are heavily reliant on water-based sectors, like 
agriculture and mining, to foster and enhance social and economic development65.  An estimated 
70% of Southern Africa’s population relies on agriculture for the survival of their livelihoods66. Apart 
from driving economic development through large industries that depend largely on water, water 
also has a “catalytic role in SADC’s development”67. It is evident through research and studies in this 
field that countries with improved access to clean water and sanitation services have higher annual 
growth rates (approximately 3.7%) when compared to similar countries suffering from water-stress 
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conditions (resulting in a lower growth rate of 0.1%)68. Creating governance strategies which 
emphasize the development and enhanced management of water resources also renders significant 
economic gains. It is estimated that improvements between US $15 and $30 billion in water 
resource management in developing countries can directly lead to annual income returns of more 
than US$ 60 billion69.  
Moving beyond the more traditional uses of water for agriculture, drinking water and industrial 
usage, water is also becoming a significant source of economic development in other sectors of the 
economy including tourism and hydro-electrical energy production, which has become increasingly 
sought-after in the quest to reduce carbon emissions and produce energy in a more environmentally 
friendly and sustainable way70. Water has also become important for growth in manufacturing and 
trade at a regional level, through growth corridors including Maputo, Beira and the Trans-Kalahari; 
as well as cross-border enterprises71. Water’s potential to advance economic development in the 
region is effectively highlighted in the case of South Africa, in which 70% of South Africa’s Gross 
National Product (GNP) stems from the four international river basins which flow through the 
country, directly and indirectly contributing to 90% of mining activity and electricity produced in the 
country72.  
The example above illustrates just how important the water sector in Southern Africa is for socio-
economic development. In a region that is characterised by a large presence of cross-border river 
water sources, it is imperative that cooperation between riparian sovereign states is fostered and 
sustained in order to ensure that socio-economic development can continue to progress. As such, 
the adoption and implementation of policies which seek to promote good governance and 
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management over water resources has become a pivotal mandate of regional bodies like SADC, as 
well as sub-regional water regimes, in order to foster economic and social development.  
After highlighting core concepts to be used in this dissertation; as well as exploring the hydro-
political context of Southern Africa, including pressures faced, opportunities and potential for socio-
economic development within the Southern African water sector, this thesis shall now explore the 
various theories to which international cooperation over trans-boundary water courses have 
traditionally been attributed. These include political will and trust; development functionalism; 







3. Theories of cooperation for trans-
boundary water courses 
From an exploration of the literature surrounding trans-boundary water courses and international 
cooperation it would appear that there exist three main theories expounding on the drivers of 
cooperation which can be applied to cooperation over trans-boundary water courses between 
sovereign riparian states. These theoretical frameworks include theories on regional development 
functionalism; neoliberal institutionalism, drawing on the importance of political will and trust; and 
norms theory within a constructivist approach. These theories will subsequently be explored in 
relation to hydro-political cooperation and joint management between riparian states over trans-
boundary water sources cooperation and management.  
Regionalism  
Regionalism and theories of regional integration have been infused with links to cooperation 
between sovereign states. Cooperation over shared resources has been to a large extent influenced 
by regional integration that has come to existence through shared goals of regional socio-economic 
development. In order to fully understand the pivotal role that regionalism, and most notably 
development functionalism, has played in fostering cooperation between riparian states, it is 
important to understand the core tenets of regionalism and the various theories that emerge within 
this school of thought. This section will therefore delve into an explanation of regionalism, delving 
into 'old' and 'new' theories of regionalism, focusing specifically on development functionalism 
within new theories of regionalism, which this dissertation will argue is a significant driver of 




 ‘Old’ Regionalism  
Developed in the 1950s and 1960s, early theories of regionalism revolved around the European 
experience of regional integration. The processes involved here informed the assumptions of Ernst 
Haas, the founder of neo-functionalism, who postulated that regional integration led by economic 
motives, would eventually spill over into political integration between states73. This idea of 
‘functional spill over’ strove to eradicate the artificial boundary between the economic and political 
realm and in doing so emphasized how economic drivers of integration could in turn result in 
political integration. This is illustrated in non-political institutions established, like the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), which in time transformed into the European Economic Community 
(ECC), and ultimately “locked” its member nations into processes of integration, in turn ensuring 
cooperation between states that transcended beyond the realm of economics and into political 
institutions74.  
In an African context, this type of regionalism, in which technical cooperation turns into political 
cooperation has not yet been fully transposed, as many regional bodies have been unable to foster 
effective regional integration. This inability has been attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, these 
low levels of regional integration are a result of the low levels of industrialization and technological 
capacity within post-liberation Africa75. Secondly, regional trade and political cooperation is more 
challenging due to the vast expanse of the regions in Africa, which are far larger than their European 
counter-parts. Finally, methods of old regionalism do not exemplify the African experience of 
regionalism as there is a certain degree of reluctance from African states to concede their 
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sovereignty and authority to regional bodies, as the struggle for independence under colonial rule 
still presents a significant psychological barrier to integration76. 
‘New’ Regionalism  
A new wave of regionalism emerged in the 1980s along with the rise of neo-liberal economic theory 
in the international system and in conjunction with the denouement of the Cold War and the 
emergence of democratic transitions sweeping across the world. As opposed to old regionalism’s 
state-centric approach, theories of ‘new’ regionalism focus on factors that have even greater 
prevalence for the process of regionalism. These include market forces, civil society’s influence, 
private sector business relations, and transnational activist networks and informal cross-border 
relations77. ‘New’ regionalism is divided into two subsequent schools of thought: ‘open regionalism’; 
and ‘developmental functionalism’, of which the latter will be argued as a significant driver of 
cooperation over trans-boundary water courses in Southern Africa78. 
Open Regionalism  
‘Open regionalism’ refers to integration led by market forces, effectively applying the principles of 
neo-liberal economics at a regional level. As opposed to ‘old’ regionalism which was inward-looking, 
protectionist and the embodiment of self-reliance; ‘new’ regionalism is outward-looking and 
inclusive, stressing the importance of regional integration by breaking down barriers that exist to 
trade and investment79. Open regionalism emphasizes the importance of exports and extra-regional 
trade, which ultimately fosters economic efficiency and growth through the active participation in 
wealth-creating and maximising opportunities at a global level80. The core assumption of open 
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regionalism suggests that trade and investment, driven by market forces, non-state actors and the 
private sector, drives the regional integration of states into the global economy81.  
Development Functionalism 
In a similar vein to open regionalism, development functionalism – often considered the “third way” 
of regionalism – acknowledges that market expansion has the ability to create important 
opportunities that enable firms to become competitive at a regional level, but also strives to resolve 
some of the challenges and failures of the market of open regionalism, for example the 
asymmetrical distribution of gains and productive capacity82. While open regionalism focuses on the 
importance of regionalism motivated by objective market forces, development functionalism 
stresses the significance of political cooperation between states, with states acting as the primary 
drivers of regional cooperation83. This theory pivots around the concept of developing states and 
promotes the idea that state intervention in the market is essential in order to advance national 
development agendas84. Regional projects, driven by states as opposed to market forces, are a 
central component of regionalism driven by development integration85. There are a number of other 
important components that characterise the process of development functionalism. Firstly, 
integration is fostered through social and economic development objectives, which seeks to improve 
national productivity in regional markets through “improved infrastructure, policy coordination, 
state loans and subsidy incentives”86. Secondly, development functionalism strives to create an 
equilibrium between certain discrepancies which exist between various member states (economic, 
technological etc.), through state-led corrective measures which aim to create an equal distribution 
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of the gains of socio-economic development initiatives87. Development functionalism highlights the 
importance of equally distributing gains and the productive capacity of states, which is enhanced 
through inter-governmental cooperation88 . Subsequently, this stream of regional integration reverts 
to Haas’ core belief that economic integration will evolve into political integration. However, where 
Haas focused on market forces as imperative to economic integrations, development functionalism 
has been most notably a result of state-led initiatives, resulting in a multi-faceted approach to 
regional integration89.This is particularly pertinent to regionalism in the case of Southern Africa.   
Cooperation over Shared Water Courses and Development functionalism  
In terms of cooperation over trans-boundary water courses it would seem that development 
functionalism provides a convincing framework for analysis, as countries that belong to a regional 
body or organisation will be more inclined to engage in cooperative behaviour than countries where 
there is a lack of regional solidarity, as cooperative behaviour has already been instilled upon 
becoming a member state. This is enhanced by transnational and multilateral development 
initiatives, including regional energy power pools, ameliorated communication and transportation 
networks, integrated water resource management (IWRM) and joint management of regional parks 
and protected areas, which span across sovereign boundaries in turn creating cooperative ties that 
move a region towards cooperation and peace90.  
In addition to creating development initiatives on a regional level, an important aspect of 
development functionalism is the emphasis placed on the equal distribution of gains and outcomes 
from joint regional management strategies. This is an important aspect to cooperation over trans-
boundary water courses as equal distribution of gains and benefits derived from shared water 
systems for all riparian states, acts as an important and necessary incentive for cooperation. 
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Upstream riparian countries will be more inclined to cooperate and refrain from upstream 
developments, which could jeopardise or affect downstream usage, if there are mechanisms in place 
to ensure that the gains from river basins are equally distributed among regional riparian states. 
Where basin-wide benefits are asymmetrically distributed, riparian states could be tempted to 
follow their own national interests and development agendas forsaking important basin-wide 
priorities and interests. Benefit-sharing is an important aspect of development functionalism and is 
changing the discourse on management over trans-boundary water systems from one of 'water-
sharing' to 'benefit-sharing'91.  
Limitations of development functionalism  
While benefit-sharing is a noble pursuit, it is quite an elusive goal to achieve as it is difficult in some 
cases to ascertain the actual and virtual value of water in a river basin system and to this extent, as 
shall be discussed in the case of the Okavango River Basin, has yet to established. This is perhaps the 
greatest limitation to the application of development functionalism as a driver of cooperation over 
trans-boundary water sources in Southern Africa. While regional development initiatives do help to 
cement cooperative relations, without effective mechanisms to share the gains of these initiatives, 
cooperation is unlikely to be prioritised over national interests or sustained in the long-run. 
However, establishing such benefit-sharing schemes would certainly enhance and aid the 
sustainability of cooperation as it would create further incentives for regional riparian members to 
cooperate and harmonise their national interests with neighbouring riparian states. It is therefore an 
important recommendation for riparian states and scholars to be cognisant of should they wish to 
enhance cooperation through development initiatives.  
A further critique of development functionalism as a driver of cooperation over shared water 
resource governance is that states will only cooperate as long as it is in their national interest to do 
so. While cooperative efforts will be more likely if, joint development initiatives have been 
                                                          




embarked upon, it is perhaps more realistic to assert that development functionalism only drives 
cooperation as far as riparian states’ national interests are served.    
Finally, in contrast to optimists of development functionalism, who laud the efforts of regional 
bodies like SADC, there also exists a certain degree of pessimism towards SADC’s efficacy in 
curtailing future water conflict in the region and fostering cooperation. This includes the opinions of 
Peter Ashton (2003), as well as Mark Zetioun and Jeroen Werner (2006), all of whom seem to 
suggest that regional bodies like SADC do not have the institutional capacity to effectively carry out 
policies and agreements established between all member states. There seems to be no legislative 
framework that can inflict punishments for cheating and following national interests above 
cooperative regional agendas, to this extent regional bodies like SADC are unable to effectively 
mitigate conflict or create sustainable cooperation between riparian states. These scholars have also 
highlighted this weak institutional capacity and have alluded to the fact that member states within 
the SADC region do not have any sort of mechanism in place to compel them to follow through with 
regional cooperation. This reverts again to the reference of Putnam’s two-level game theory notion, 
as Ashton suggests that states have to balance national and international pressures, and often when 
faced with insecurities will choose short term national interests which sway away from cooperation 
and result in conflict and disputes between riparian member states. 
Despite these limitations, development functionalism does provide a compelling account of how 
cooperation can be fostered in Southern African, and it is important that future literature seeks to 
develop on this reasoning especially as the SADC region continues to advance the region’s 
geopolitical standing through development initiatives.   
Neoliberal Institutionalism  
In a similar theoretical paradigm, and quite closely linked to regional development functionalism, is 




structures and legal frameworks, which play a crucial and invaluable role in fostering cooperation 
among riparian states. 
Neoliberal institutionalism is an offshoot of the liberal school of thought which emphasizes the 
cooperative potential of states, in particular mature democracies, especially when working together 
through effective institutions92.  For an effective explanation, the assumptions of neoliberalism are 
often explained in reference to its adversary, neorealism. Neorealists assert that the international 
system is anarchic, therefore breeding uncertainty, competition and at times conflict between 
egoistic and value-maximising states, effectively stifling cooperative efforts. For scholars of 
neorealism, cooperation is considered unachievable in an anarchic system as states, being the most 
important actors, will weigh up the relative gains of cooperation, and being value-maximizers, will 
often resort to defecting as opposed to cooperating93. This defective behaviour is an attempt to gain 
more than their counter-part, subsequently resulting in zero-sum outcomes for both states and a 
consequent Prisoners Dilemma type of situation, as defined by game theoreticians94. 
Absolute gains facilitate cooperation  
Like neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism agrees that the international system is indeed anarchic 
and does limit the achievement of international cooperation. However, scholars of neoliberal 
institutionalism hold a more optimistic perspective, asserting that while the international system is 
indeed anarchic, therefore constraining the "willingness of states to cooperate”, the formation of 
institutions has the potential to increase the capacity of states to cooperate95. This assumption is 
premised on the belief that states are "atomistic" actors who seek to maximise their own gains and 
are apathetic to the gains of other states. In this regard absolute gains lessen the chances of 
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cheating and enhance cooperative relations between states96.  To this extent, institutions act as a 
coordinating body, helping states to seize optimal gains from cooperation. The construction of this 
"focal point" thereby enhances cooperative outcomes between states97.  Ultimately institutions 
serve as a mechanism through which a greater degree of coordination and cooperation can be 
realised, in such a way that benefits both parties. This once again links in to the benefit-sharing 
framework that has overtaken the discourse on cooperation over trans-boundary water courses, as 
explored under development functionalism, suggesting that mechanisms which seek to enhance and 
equally divide benefits derived from basin systems are important drivers of cooperation.  
Institutions as information-sharing platforms  
In addition, international institutions are able to increase states' capacity for cooperation as they act 
as information-sharing platforms, effectively minimizing uncertainty and security risks that arise in 
the anarchic international system. Member states that join international organisations and adhere to 
international frameworks often come together on the basis of shared beliefs and values, formulating 
common rules which further reinforce the potential for cooperation98. Through the formation of a 
forum in which information can be shared among all states, opportunities for cheating are 
effectively minimized. In relation to cooperation and joint management over shared water 
resources, the sharing of hydrological information reduces uncertainty, creates confidence and 
results in the de-securitization of states, effectively enhancing cooperation among them99.  
Policy coordination & legal institutional frameworks for cooperation  
Furthermore, a key element of international institutions is the formulation of coordinated policies 
and legal frameworks, which seek to create common rules to govern the activities of member states. 
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Strong institutional frameworks, whether legally binding or not, are of utmost importance in 
enhancing cooperative relations between states. A key hypothesis in the work of Anthony Turton, 
Peter Ashton and Eugene Cloete, relating to cooperation over trans-boundary water courses, 
pertains to the number of policy options available. Their hypothesis asserts that cooperative 
relations will increase substantially in proportion to the number of coordinated policies established 
and available to states100. Importantly international laws surrounding the governance of water, 
which includes treaties, protocols, national policies and institutional legislation, are pivotal for 
efficient and effective cooperation and management of shared water systems101. Even when 
protocols and policies are not legally binding, the mere acceptance thereof by member states is 
sufficient for cooperative relations over water courses to ensue. A number of international, regional 
and national protocols and legal frameworks will be discussed in the following chapter in relation to 
those that are applicable to the case of the Okavango River Basin.  
Political will & trust for the sustainability of cooperation  
Institutions, water regimes, River Basin Organisations (RBOs) and the various agreements and 
protocols included within them, are important mechanisms for establishing confidence and trust 
between riparian states, rendering institutions as a critical element for sustainable cooperative and 
peaceful management over and utilisation of trans-boundary water courses102. The establishment of 
political trust is a particularly important aspect of neoliberal institutionalism which is an essential 
driver of cooperation among riparian states. One of the reasons institutions have become 
recognised as a key driver for cooperative relations between riparian member states, is their 
capacity to create political trust among shared water course users. Trust although abstract, is an 
extremely pivotal concept with regards to cooperation, because without mutual trust, it is unlikely 
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that cooperative efforts and coordinated policies can be established. Peter Ashton and Marion Neal 
assert that effective management and usage of shared water courses is highly dependent on mutual 
trust and the will to collaborate103.  It is of course no mean feat to institutionalise the political will 
necessary to establish cooperation and subsequently develop trust among riparian states.  
Finally, as argued by Aaron Wolf, institutions are critical for cooperation. He asserts that once 
institutions are established it is extremely difficult for countries to back out of established water 
regimes and abandon international obligations agreed to104. Wolf has even gone so far as to suggest, 
through evidence of water basin institutions like the Amazon, La Plata and the Mekong commissions, 
that even when relations among riparian states are strained, international institutions generally 
remain resilient to tensions and cooperation is sustained105.  States come to value river basin 
agreements and organisations as they help to ensure that international relations over shared water 
courses are more stable and that peaceful diplomatic relations over water courses ensue. This 
stream of thought again reinforces the relevance of neoliberalism as a core theoretical framework 
with which to explain cooperation among riparian states over trans-boundary water courses.  
There are a number of regional and international institutions which support the pursuit of 
cooperation over trans-boundary water courses, particularly pertaining to cooperation over the 
Okavango River Basin, which will be discussed in the following chapter.  
Limitations to neoliberal institutionalism  
Neoliberal institutionalism provides a particularly strong explanation for what drives and sustains 
cooperation over shared water courses. However, it would be replete not to mention certain 
downfalls to the theory of neoliberal institutionalism as an analytical framework of analysis for the 
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drivers of cooperation over trans-boundary water courses.  Perhaps the most significant criticism of 
institutions as a driver of cooperation again stems from a pessimistic realist perspective which 
suggests that institutions act merely as a cover for states to pursue their own interests. Scholars like 
Coleen Fox and Chris Sneddon (2006) argue that while water regimes, institutions and the 
agreements ratified therein are legitimised as a way to enhance human security and the ecological 
integrity of the water source in question, they instead tend to promote “state-centric environmental 
securitization”106. To this extent they suggest that while these protocols seem progressive and 
grounded in international law, they are likely to be a guise for national interests that may include 
environmental degradation on a small, if not unnoticeable scale, which may become serious in the 
long term, creating “ecological and human security crises” if not recognised107.  
 
Another criticism of institutions as a driver of cooperation picks up on the legality of the agreements 
subsumed within the established water regimes. As mentioned in the critique of development 
functionalism, it would seem that it is difficult for protocols and their legislation to be effectively 
enforced and as such difficult to hold riparian states accountable should they defect from their 
obligations. Scholars like Aaron Wolf have suggested that this deficiency is exacerbated in the 
international realm by poorly developed international law, which is “unenforceable” and 
“contradictory” to certain national legislation108.  
Norms and conventions  
The final theoretical framework and driver of international cooperation for shared water systems, is 
a normative approach under constructivism. International norms and conventions, linked to some 
extent to institutional legislation, protocols and policies established within water regimes, RBOs and 
other international institutions, are an important source of support for cooperation and to some 
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degree legitimise the need for cooperation over trans-boundary water courses. It is important to 
note the similarities between institutions and norms as there has been some degree of conceptual 
convergence between the two. Constructivists refer to 'norms' as behavioural rules, whereas 
sociologists refer to these behavioural standards as 'institutions'109. The concept of institutions has 
also been used to denote a "relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate 
behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations"110. However, a marked difference 
between a norm and an institution can be located in their scale: norms refer to distinct standards of 
appropriate behaviour; while institutions focus on the interaction and interrelation of behavioural 
rules and how they are connected together111. This dissertation ultimately views cooperation in the 
sociological sense as a mix of practices, policies and norms that come to fruition through states 
cooperating and coordinating national and regional policies; however, this specific section will focus 
on norms of cooperation within the international system and how these have sought to foster 
cooperative behaviour amongst riparian states with shared water resources, as a new pattern within 
international water politics.  
Subsumed within a constructivist theoretical perspective, which emphasizes the importance of the 
social construction of ideas and values in conjunction with the influence of norms on international 
politics, norms established in the international arena play a significant role in shaping behaviour of 
actors in the international system112. Alexander Wendt, in direct contestation of the realist belief 
that anarchy stifles cooperation, suggests that anarchy is ultimately what states makes of it. To this 
extent norms and conventions which promote cooperation, and have been widely accepted and 
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internalised by the international community at large, are becoming the new standard form of 
appropriate behaviour amongst states who share resources across sovereign borders113.  
There appear to be three distinct types of norms that have been identified by scholars across a 
variety of academic fields. These categories of norms include: 'regulative' norms which constrain and 
instruct behaviour ; 'constitutive' norms which sees the emergence of new actors, behaviours and 
values; and finally 'prescriptive' or 'evaluative' norms which inform appropriate behaviour with a 
sense of what actors should do, as Finnemore and Sikkink so aptly phrased it, containing an element 
of "oughtness"114.  Under a constructivist approach prescriptive norms form the essence of analysis. 
This section will suggest that there has been an increased emphasis on norms of international 
cooperation which have helped to reinforce and support cooperative efforts among states over 
shared water systems.  
Before delving into these internationally established norms and convections that pertain directly to  
trans-boundary water cooperation, it is important to briefly highlight the life-cycle of norms in order 
to illustrate how they can ultimately influence behaviour and drive international cooperation 
between states.  The extent to which norms are accepted, either at a regional or global level, 
depends on the stage of its life-cycle that a norm reaches. The first stage of the life cycle of a norm is 
the emergence of a norm that is created through norm entrepreneurs115. After the first stage there is 
a "tipping point" in which broad acceptance of a norm follows suit and is known as a "norm 
cascade"116.  The final stage of a norm's life-cycle is the internalization of the norm, in which norms 
are no longer debatable or contested but have become so widely accepted that they are often taken 
for granted117.  
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The norm of international cooperation over shared water courses can be said to have reached 
international internalization as there exist a number of international conventions which stress the 
importance of this norm. These include norms at an international and regional level. 
At an international level there exist a number of conventions which have placed significant emphasis 
on the importance of international cooperation over shared water resources. These include the 
United Nations' International Decade for  Action, 'Water for Life: 2005-2015', which has an intent 
focus on promoting trans-boundary water source cooperation for the sustainable usage of water 
sources for development and for the basic needs of people in light of the growing crisis of water 
scarcity; the declaration of 2013 as the 'International Year of Water Cooperation'; following on from 
'World Water Day' in 2009 which was centred around the theme of 'Shared Waters, Shared 
Opportunities'; and finally the UN-Thematic Priority Area on Transboundary Waters which strives to 
act as a platform for cooperation and the coordination of activities and policies of member 
countries.   The global recognition of the norm of cooperation over trans-boundary water courses 
has been further emphasized outside of pure water conventions, and through norms and 
conventions on climate change and human development. These include the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well as and the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) framework, in which both water, and the effective governance thereof 
are critical features.  
Limitations of norms and conventions as drivers of cooperation  
In a similar vein to the critiques of development functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism, norms 
and conventions are limited in their conception as drivers of cooperation as a result of the lack of 
enforceability of these norms in the international system. While norms may be internalised to such 
an extent that they become unquestionable and expected standards of behaviour, states which seek 
to advance their own national interests may defect from norms of cooperation, in turn disregarding 




Furthermore, the fact that norms and conventions may be easily reneged on is reinforced by the fact 
that cooperation, as argued by Mirumachi and Zeitoun, has varying levels. As a result these norms 
may foster cooperation at a superficial level whereby states may agree to cooperate but do not in 
effect practically engage in cooperative behaviour with other riparian states. That fact that norms 
and conventions are not legally binding prevents states from fully committing to cooperative 
behaviour, as they are regarded as something that states ought to engage in, but if not adhered to, 
will not have major negative implications in their geopolitical standing.  
Sub-conclusion of theories of drivers of international cooperation over 
shared water courses 
This chapter has sought to highlight various theories within international relations which can be used 
to explain what drives cooperation over shared water courses across political boundaries. This 
section has highlighted that cooperation over trans-boundary water courses between riparian states 
can be attributed in general to regional development functionalism which strives to promote 
development both socially and economically at a regional level through development initiatives 
focused on shared water courses with an emphasis on equitable benefit-sharing. In addition, within 
the theoretical perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, institutions along with protocols, 
legislation and agreements established therein, are significant sources for cooperation as they foster 
cooperative behaviour as they serve as information-sharing, benefit-sharing and trust-building 
platforms between riparian member states. Finally, international cooperation over shared 
watercourses can be attributed to international and regional conventions which have internalized 
the importance of cooperation in order to achieve the harmonization of national riparian water 
policies and activities in order to sustain a number of global goals including climate adaption and 
mitigation; development goals; and high degrees of cooperation between states across all sectors.  
The following chapter will subsequently analyse these various theoretical frameworks as drivers of 




been the most significant driver of cooperation. This will help to inform other regions in which 
cooperation has yet to be achieved and where efforts for cooperation over shared waters should be 
focused. In light of pressing challenges including climate change and population growth which have 
culminated in a global water scarcity crisis, it is important for the practicalities of these drivers to be 
assessed in order to ensure that these pressures do not lead to a the securitization of states’ 







4. Drivers of Cooperation in the 
Okavango River Basin  
After highlighting theories of cooperation that emerge from the literature, it now becomes pertinent 
to identify which of these theories is most significant and relevant with regards to cooperation over 
trans-boundary water courses in practice. Before applying the above theories to cooperation among 
Angola, Namibia and Botswana over the Okavango River Basin, it is important to understand the 
hydro-political character of the river basin; the socio-economic and political context of each of the 
riparian states; and their development agendas looking forward, which will certainly have a direct 
impact on the usage of the River Basin.  
Overview of the Okavango River Basin  
According to T.S McCarthy and W. N. Ellery, the Okavango River Basin is a classic example of a trans-
boundary system in which 
both human and ecosystem 
needs are in competition for 
relatively scarce water 
supplies in a particularly arid 
region118. The delicate 
balance between basic 
human needs, national 
development and ecological 
preservation in a water 
                                                          




stressed region has been effectively managed between its three riparian states Angola, Namibia and 
Botswana for twenty years, as the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) 
celebrated its twentieth anniversary in September 2014.  The example of the Okavango River Basin 
therefore provides an interesting and relevant example for the application of theories of 
cooperation in order to assess which are the most significant drivers of cooperation on the ground.  
An understanding of the true drivers of cooperation in reality will help to establish cooperation over 
shared watercourses where it has yet to be formed. In addition, it will also help to enhance 
cooperation between already established water agreements and RBOs in light of the growing 
challenges of climate change and population growth, which seek to undermine cooperation and 
threatens a reversion to the securitization of riparian states.  
Importance of regional cooperation for effective joint management of the Okavango River 
Basin   
The Okavango River Basin is considered to be one of the last “near-pristine” aquatic ecosystems in 
Africa covering approximately 700,000m2. Originating in Angola, the Cuito and Cubango Rivers 
merge at the border between Namibia and Angola, forming the Cubango-Okavango River which 
flows through the Kalahari Desert and subsequently spills out from the panhandle and into the 
Okavango Delta in north-Western Botswana. With its rich biodiversity that is perfectly synced to the 
biological cycles of numerous native plant, bird and wildlife species, the Cubango-Okavango River 
Basin is a globally significant river system of utmost ecological importance. In addition, the River 
Basin provides rural communities situated on the peripheries of the river system with numerous 
ecosystem services to support their livelihoods.  These services include water, land for small-scale 
agriculture and livestock grazing, fish, reeds for thatching and medicinal plants. In addition the 
Okavango Delta, which flows downstream into north-western Botswana, is a significant source of 
income-generation from tourism, generating over US$ 866 million per annum since 2012119. The 
                                                          





Okavango River Basin is also significant as it contributes to the socio-economic development of all 
three riparian countries. Estimates show that the total amount of water abstracted from the River 
Basin annually amounts to 31.4Mm3   120. 
Angola  
After almost three decades of a stifling war of independence, followed by a protracted civil war 
ending in 2002, Angola has become increasingly dependent on water abstraction from the Cubango-
Okavango River Basin as a means to boost economic growth and enhance the livelihoods of its 
population after war crippled the economy and left a "legacy of starvation" and the displacement of 
thousands of Angolan citizens121. Angola's renewed focus on economic development is embedded in 
the belief that a sustainable economic future will prevent the reversion to civil war. Angola has the 
highest level of water abstraction of the three riparian states accounting for 53.1 % of overall river 
basin abstractions, despite being relatively water rich as it straddles four other trans-boundary river 
basins: namely the Cunene, the Zaire, the Cuvelai and the Zambezi river basin122. Livestock and 
agricultural developments, particularly in the form of irrigation schemes, constitute the bulk of 
Angola’s water abstractions from the River Basin.   
 
As stated in its respective National Action Plan for the Sustainable Management of the Cubango-
Okavango River Basin in 2011, Angola has expressed particular interest in developing two mini-
hydropower stations to be built by 2016, in addition to the already existing hydropower plant 
situated at the Cubango River123. This could potentially threaten the hydrological character, water 
quality and future availability of water for lower catchments of the river basin and its riparian users. 
This in turn could undermine cooperative efforts if not properly reviewed by Namibia and Botswana.  
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Namibia, which is notably more arid, follows closely behind Angola and abstracts 42.5% of the 
Systems’ total water124. There are four perennial rivers which flow through Namibia, including the 
Cunene River; the Cuando/Linyanti/Chobe River Basin complex; the Zambezi River and the Orange 
River. However, the Kuvango River Basin, as it is referred to in Namibia, is “the only exploitable 
perennial river” as all other perennial rivers are situated too far away from high water-demand 
areas125. The Okavango River Basin is thus of prime importance for water abstraction in order to 
meet Namibia's pressing water needs. In addition the Kuvango River Basin is also a key source of 
abstraction for Namibia's Green Scheme irrigation and cultivation project, which constitutes the 
majority of water abstractions for the country.  
 
There are currently plans underway to revive a water-transfer scheme that would transport Kuvango 
surface water from Rundu to the Eastern National Water Carrier at Grootfontein, thereby supplying 
Namibia’s main centres of demand126. This scheme effectively ensures that if existing internal water 
resources are exhausted, Namibia will be guaranteed of continued water supply from the Kuvango 
River.    
Botswana 
Botswana, in contrast, abstracts a mere 4.4% of the total annual riparian abstractions, with the 
majority of its abstractions used for livestock and domestic use127. In 2012, the new Boseto copper 
mine, which is situated in Ngamiland in the highly prospective Kalahari copper belt of north-western 
Botswana, began its operations and is expected to have use 1.3 Mm3 of ground water annually, 
which would, in conjunction with other projected increases in water abstraction for livestock and 
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domestic use, effectively increase Botswana’s total water demand to 14 Mm3 from 12.65 Mm3 128. 
While Botswana abstracts the least amount of water, the income generated from the Okavango 
Delta is significant, generating approximately US$866 million and creating 49,500 jobs in 2012 
alone129.   
It is clear that the Okavango River Basin and its associated ecosystems are highly beneficial for all 
three riparian countries. To ensure that the ecological benefits of the Okavango River Basin are 
preserved, joint management and the effective harmonisation of and coordination between the 
national water policies of Angola, Namibia and Botswana are essential, especially in light of 
increased water abstraction projections and the challenges faced in terms of climate change and 
population growth. 
Cooperation over the Okavango River Basin can provide useful lessons as to what drives and sustains 
cooperation in order to inform future cooperation over trans-boundary water courses regionally and 
internationally where water basin agreements are yet to be established. Upon close analysis of 
cooperation between Angola, Botswana and Namibia over the Okavango River Basin, it appears that 
three important drivers of cooperation emerge. These include: political trust; regional integration 
through development; and the presence of strong legal institutional frameworks and norms.  
Challenges to cooperation over the Okavango River Basin  
However, despite OKACOM's sterling track record of cooperation there are certain challenges which 
are beginning to emerge which could potentially undermine the sustainability of the twenty years of 
cooperation among Angola, Namibia and Botswana. It is important to highlight these challenges 
specifically in light of the theoretical analysis that will commence hereafter, as these challenges will 
reinforce which of these theoretical frameworks have been most significant in driving cooperation, 
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and which theories of cooperation have been less useful in the case of the Okavango River Basin, but 
could still be employed to advance and enhance cooperation among riparian member states.  
Whilst cooperation over the Okavango River Basin provides a good model for trans-boundary 
resource management, there are still significant challenges that OKACOM faces to the sustainability 
of cooperation. These challenges include increasing pressures of river basin population growth 
(expected to increase from 921 890 to 1.28 million people by 2025); long-term variability and 
climate change impacts (including increased temperatures of between 2°C to 4°C and changes in 
rainfall); land use change; and high poverty levels in all three basin countries. In order to ensure that 
climate change and population growth do not adversely impact on the management of the Basin it is 
crucial that OKACOM sufficiently integrates climate change adaption into its basin management 
strategy.  
In addition the political scene is changing with all the three riparian countries becoming increasingly 
geared towards expanding their economic prospects, thus resulting in expected increases in water 
abstraction for developments and subsequent increases in water demand to over 400 Mm3 and up 
to 4000 Mm3 in certain projected future scenarios130. This raises two important questions: firstly, 
how does this demand compare to the scope of the ‘development space’ vis-à-vis the optimal 
allocation of water for withdrawal and use for the overall system; and secondly, how to share these 
benefits equitably among Basin member states. 
A further challenge is the asymmetrical distribution of benefits which each river basin country 
derives from the Okavango River Basin. In 2014 figures shows that the total Gross National Income 
of the entire Okavango Basin amounts to US$ 234 085 700. Of this, Botswana generates US$ 
177 317 500, predominantly from its booming tourism industry in the Delta, whilst Angola and 
Namibia derive US$ 13 563 700 and US$ 43 204 500 respectively131. A pertinent issue which 
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subsequently arises is how to ensure that these discrepancies do not incentivise upstream riparian 
countries from unilaterally implementing development schemes in and around the River Basin that 
would defeat the ends of Basin sustainability.  
To ensure that the these incentives do not undermine cooperation over the River Basin it is 
important that OKACOM establishes an economic water accounting (EWA) mechanism to effectively 
measure the usage, value, costs and benefits of the River Basin to ensure that the demands on the 
basin do not undermine its biological and hydrological functioning, causing further environmental 
degradation and subsequent socio-economic losses. While Namibia and Botswana have already 
established national water accounting systems, an EWA for the entire basin system is yet to be fully 
implemented. In addition OKACOM has started to think about creating a benefit sharing mechanism, 
aimed at more effectively distributing the asymmetrical gains of the River Basin. OKACOM should 
also consider an integrated tourism plan for the system to ensure that the benefits of tourism are 
distributed to all three riparian countries. This could include an information-sharing platform for 
basin-wide tourism and wildlife experiences that would span across all three riparian states, making 
use of joint marketing plans; and encouraging partnerships with the private sector and community 
trusts.  
Assessing the drivers of cooperation in the case of the Okavango River 
Basin  
 
Along with the above recommendations it is important to analyse the cooperation over trans-
boundary water courses when applied to the case of the Okavango River Basin, to assess which 
drivers have been most significant and where other drivers which are essential have been less 
prominent in this case study. This analysis will not only help to enhance and sustain cooperative 
efforts among Angola, Namibia and Botswana, but will also help to provide a practical account for 





which drivers are most significant for other RBOs and shared water courses where cooperative 
efforts have yet to be established.  
Development functionalism for cooperation over the Okavango River Basin  
Regional development has played a significant role in fostering cooperation between Angola, 
Namibia and Botswana over the Okavango River Basin.  The theory of development functionalism, as 
highlighted in the previous chapter, focuses on political cooperation between states with regional 
development initiatives acting as the main drive or regional cooperation132. OKACOM and its three 
signatory riparian states have recognised the importance of the Okavango River Basin as an 
important mechanism for the advancement of social and economic development in the region. As 
such Angola, Namibia and Botswana through OKACOM strive to ensure that the benefits of this 
ecosystem are effectively managed so that future benefits will not be eroded due to negligent and 
misaligned national development agendas.  
Basin-wide development initiatives for cooperation   
 
Poverty Alleviation 
All three countries share an overarching policy objective to alleviate poverty and to ameliorate 
welfare and living conditions of their respective populations through economic growth133. Economic 
growth in essence would result in expected increases in future water demands134.  To this extent, 
through the shared vision of regional development and poverty alleviation, Angola, Namibia and 
Botswana have to coordinate their national development agendas through cooperative and open 
relations in order to ensure that projected increased demands for water do not undermine the 
sustainable usage and ecological integrity of the basin.  
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Policies for agriculture and food security development  
An important development objective for all three Okavango River Basin states is to increase 
agricultural production both for food security and for the creation of employment and jobs for their 
citizenry through the expansion of agricultural export industries135. These objectives will certainly 
form the drivers of decisions made on development options in the basin, as developments in the 
agricultural sector will necessarily require increased water abstraction from the basin, as identified 
by both Namibia and Angola136.  
Energy policy development 
A key development initiative for the basin is the improvement of energy security which would entail 
increasing the amount of energy available and the reliability of its supply, which is of course another 
crucial facet for economic development137. Both Namibia and Botswana are included in the Southern 
African Power Pool (SAPP), which seeks to develop the regional grid and increase regional energy 
generation capacity. Through cooperation on development outside of basin-related issues, Namibia 
and Botswana have effectively deepened cooperation on other levels, in turn enhancing already-
established cooperative efforts over the Okavango River Basin.  
With a particular focus on renewable energy sources, given the negative relationship of energy 
generation from fossil fuels and climate change, development of energy security has also given rise 
to the identification of hydropower as a critical source of energy generation, specifically on the part 
of Angola.  All of Angola's proposed hydropower energy projects, apart from Mucundi, are to be 
located in the Angolan portion of the Cubango-Okavango River Basin in the form of 'run-of-river 
schemes'138.  
To this extent, basin-wide development initiatives that involve abstraction from the basin and could 
affect the hydrological capacity and functioning of the basin require cooperative and collaborative 
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coordination between riparian states. Through discussions of development schemes, with open and 
transparent information provided to all OKACOM member states, and negotiations in which member 
states can abstain from agreement, cooperation is actively practiced, driven and enhanced as 
member states are given 60 days to respond to initiatives and voice their opinions, while keeping the 
welfare and ecological integrity of the basin at the forefront of all decisions made. 
Regional development initiatives 
Cooperation between riparian states over the Okavango River Basin is also driven to some extent by 
regional development schemes led by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). There 
are numerous examples of regional development initiatives, led by SADC member states, which have 
culminated in a higher degree of regional cooperation. These initiatives include cooperative efforts 
to combat drought and increase food supply; infrastructural development and coordination for 
regional telecommunications, tourism, postal services and transportation; the establishment of 
transport corridors and related Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs); cooperation with regard to 
regional peace and security initiatives; and most significantly for this dissertation, regional 
environmental security development in the form of joint water management139.  
SADC recognises the importance of water as a significant contributor to socio-economic 
development in the region. As such it promotes cooperation among member states through 
“coordinated, sustainable and integrated development and management” of the region's shared 
water courses140. Joint management of shared water sources is essential to SADC's development 
aims, which include lowering poverty levels; enhancing food and energy security; and advancing 
industrial development, in addition to its aims to promote peace and cooperation among signatory 
states141. In order to achieve these development goals through the Southern African water sector, 
the SADC secretariat has established a set of Regional Strategic Action Plans (RSAP) along with a 
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Protocol on Shared Water Courses (PSWS) which both emphasize the importance of cooperation 
over Southern Africa's vast network of trans-boundary water courses for the attainment regional 
development goals.  
SADC's Regional Strategic Action Plans  
At present there have been three rounds of Regional Strategic Action Plans (RSAP) on Integrated 
Water Resources Development and Management. From 1999 to 2004, the first round, RSAP I was 
implemented and sought to produce an “enabling environment for the joint management of 
regional water resources”142. In addition it strove to establish an institutional foundation for the 
implementation of infrastructure projects and other development initiatives. In its entirety RSAP I 
supported the implementation of 31 projects which fall under the following categories: legal and 
regulatory framework, integrated basin-wide approach, macro-policies, knowledge management, 
public awareness, stakeholder participation, and infrastructure investment143. SADC’s RSAP has been 
praised as the “most advanced and comprehensive multi-country freshwater programme in the 
world”144. There were however certain recommendations to improve upon RSAP I’s objectives. 
These included the transformation of RSAP from a project approach to a “programme approach”; 
and shifting its focus away from creating an “enabling environment”, towards the advancement and 
development of water infrastructure145. 
With an emphasis geared towards infrastructural development, RSAP II was created to incorporate 
four strategic areas between 2004 and 2010, namely:  effective planning, development and 
management of water resources; support for infrastructure development; water governance and 
capacity building146. Upon its evaluation, RSAP II received positive reviews as it had made significant 
progress particularly with regards to achieving overall strategic objectives and implementing 
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regional water projects. Moving forward, there were suggestions that RSAP should focus more 
intently on up-and-coming issues, including climate change adaptation; ecosystem-oriented and a 
human rights base approaches to water within the paradigm of infrastructural development147.  
At present, RSAP III is in its fourth year of implementation and is expected to end in 2015 alongside 
the 2015 Millennium Development Goals deadline.  RSAP’s overarching aim is to establish an 
“effective and dependable” framework with which to reduce poverty, stimulate regional integration, 
sustain peace and security in the region, and foster socio-economic development148. RSAP’s third 
implementation phase acknowledges the importance of water resource development and effective 
management, solely intent on improving the lives of millions of people in the SADC region. The 
primary means through which RSAP seeks to achieve this is through good governance of Southern 
Africa’s watercourses, as well as enhancing and developing regional water infrastructure.149. SADC’s 
renewed vision for the region’s water through RSAP III is to obtain “an equitable and sustainable 
utilisation of water for social and environmental justice, regional integration and economic benefit 
for present and future generation”150. As highlighted by Turton, Ashton and Cloete, the large number 
of trans-boundary water courses found in the SADC region are significant cornerstones of functional 
integration and development within the region151.  
SADC's regional water strategies for development which foster cooperation are also reinforced 
through continental water development initiatives including the African Ministers Council on Water 
(ANCOW) established by the African Union (AU), which seeks to encourage cooperation, security, 
socio-economic development and poverty eradication among member states, of which Angola, 
Namibia and Botswana are member states; as well as the Southern African Vision for Water Life and 
the Environment, which share similar goals to SADC's RSAP.  
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Limits of development functionalism for cooperation  
It must be acknowledged that there are however limits to the extent to which basin-wide and 
regional development initiatives are drivers for cooperation among riparian states over the 
Okavango River Basin. Cooperation through development can be seen as somewhat inconsistent 
when viewed through current national development frameworks152. The threat of a loss of 
biodiversity in the river basin as a trade-off for social and economic development stands as a 
bulwark in river basin negotiations between member states for development initiatives and could 
even potentially undermine cooperative efforts, should the preservation of the river basin reap 
more gains for certain riparian users as opposed to others. This is perhaps the greatest challenge 
that OKACOM faces today with the political and economic landscapes of all three riparian states 
having changed substantially since the inception of OKACOM in 1994.  
To this extent development initiatives in the basin should strive to share the benefits among 
member states in order to ensure that cooperation is sustained. This could begin with Botswana's 
tourism industry with basin-wide tourism and wildlife developments that would certainly distribute 
the impressive gains of Botswana's Okavango Delta to both Angola and Namibia. Such a benefit-
sharing mechanism would enhance cooperation and ensure that upstream riparian states do not 
develop without the consent of downstream users.   
Neo-liberal institutionalism  
Given the limits of development functionalism and the sensitivity of the Okavango River Basin, a 
more significant driver of cooperative efforts in this specific example can be attributed to the strong 
institutional frameworks which govern the management of the basin. Perhaps one of the most 
important drivers for cooperation which has been of monumental importance in sustaining 
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cooperation over the Okavango River Basin, has been the presence of strong legal and institutional 
frameworks both at a basin-wide level, regionally and internationally.  
OKACOM: its origins, policies & aspirations  
In an attempt to foster regional cooperation and manage the individual national interests of each 
riparian state, the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) was established 
in 1994 as a “cooperation, coordination and information-sharing platform” with which to inspire an 
integrated response to the management of the Basin’s water resources as well as to diminish and 
eradicate unsustainable national activities of Angola, Namibia and Botswana which threaten the 
Basin’s hydrological balance153. Continued and strengthened cooperation is imperative in order to 
ensure that the upper limits of sustainable abstraction are recognized and respected, so that the 
speed and scale of national development activities do not surpass the capacity restraints of the 
system.  
Origins of OKACOM 
After Namibia gained independence in 1990, its newly established government created a number of 
water regimes with other riparian states in order to formulate a dialogue between riparian states 
around issues of sustainable development, mutually beneficial utilisation, integrated water resource 
management (IWRM) and conservation of shared water sources154. In September 1990 Namibia and 
the People's Republic of Angola renewed their already established river basin agreements on the 
Cunene River as well as re-establishing the Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC). In 
November this was followed by the formation of the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC) 
between Botswana and Namibia in order to effectively manage shared water resource governance 
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over the Okavango River Basin155. At this stage the PJTC and the JPTC were bilateral agreements in 
which all three riparian states were represented. Long before Namibia gained its sovereignty 
through independence, its desire to increase water supplies to central Namibia, where water 
demand was highest, was noted by Angola and Botswana however issues of water usage and 
abstraction could not be addressed as Namibia was not a sovereign state at the time. However, in 
1991, one year after Namibia's independence, Namibia proposed that the PJTC and the JPTC join 
forces at a combined meeting held in Windhoek on the 1st July 1991, with the intent to discuss the 
future prospects of the Okavango River Basin, particularly with regards to potentially establishing a 
tripartite river basin commission. Ultimately this collaboration led to the formation of the 
Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) on the 15th of September 1994.  
OKACOM's functions and policies  
By entering into the 1994 OKACOM Agreement, Angola, Namibia and Botswana commit themselves 
to "promoting coordinated and environmentally sustainable regional water resources development, 
while addressing social and economic needs of the riparian states"156. One of the main objectives of 
OKACOM is to advise member states on matters relating to the effective cooperative management 
of the River Basin. These issues include the sustainable long-term yield of the basin, reasonable 
demand for water abstraction, conservation issues and standards, advancement of water resources, 
and the avoidance of pollution, to name but a few157. In essence, OKACOM strives to reduce and 
avoid "unintended, unacceptable and unnecessary impacts" that could arise from uncoordinated 
water resource development158.  
So as to inform these cooperative management decisions over the Basin, OKACOM employs a variety 
of scientific tools for basin-wide planning, including the Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA), 
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along with its Integrated Flow Assessment (IFA) and the Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Management of the Okavango River Basin (EPSMO) project. Together the TDA, IFA and EPSMO 
projects are essential for OKACOM’s Strategic Actions Programme (SAP), which is a collaborative 
approach highlighting the principles and strategic direction for the development of the River Basin to 
be implemented over the next twenty years. OKACOM’s SAP strives to prevent and avoid the 
degradation and loss of important ecosystem services and wetland functioning by restricting 
unregulated upstream developments and managing unsustainable changes in land and water use. 
The SAPs are essential for informing the individual National Action Plans (NAPs) of Botswana, Angola 
and Namibia, which outlines the specific time-bound interventions of each riparian country in 
response to priorities set out in the SAP principles. Reviewed every five years, SAP’s scientific toolkit 
and policies help OKACOM to assess challenges and threats to the Basin, focusing on the relationship 
between current and future water use and hydrological flow, and identifying thresholds and the 
scope of acceptable development space. The convergence of specialists, consultants and 
mechanisms was regarded as one of the first initiatives in Southern Africa where riparian states and 
consultants came together to work towards a common objective and was seen as a significant 
achievement for integrated water resource management in the region159. As an effective 
information-sharing and policy coordination platform, OKACOM certainly fosters cooperation as the 
shared data helps in the de-securitisation of riparian states160. 
OKACOM' s objectives are guided by three broad principles. Firstly, that the sovereignty of each 
riparian state is inherent and should be respected; secondly, that national obligations of water 
utilisation from the river basin should not be to the detriment or inflict significant harm upon 
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another riparian state; and finally that water use of all three riparian states must be "equitable and 
reasonable"161. 
Future aspirations of OKACOM 
After achieving twenty years of sustained cooperation, OKACOM is seeking to enhance cooperation 
through a number of future objectives. Firstly, OKACOM has expressed desires to become more 
autonomous and less reliant on donor funding. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, OKACOM is 
looking into the creation of a financial-sharing mechanism to distribute river basin gains more 
effectively and equitably among the three riparian states162. This an important objective for 
OKACOM to achieve, as from the previous chapter, it is clear that equitable divisions of benefits 
gained from shared water courses is a significant incentive for the sustainability of cooperative 
relations between sovereign riparian states. In light of expansive national development agendas 
which seek to advance social and economic development, and in conjunction with external pressures 
like regional climate variability and population growth, establishing a financial-sharing mechanism 
can be seen as a crucial element for sustaining future cooperation between riparian states.   
Overall it can be said that the example of OKACOM provides an optimistic outlook for successful and 
sustained cooperation over trans-boundary water sources.  This reinforces the emerging consensus 
within the scholarship on trans-boundary water resource management, that trans-boundary water 
courses can be a catalyst for cooperation as opposed to inter-state tensions and even conflict, as has 
been previously hypothesized. The case of OKACOM in the Okavango River Basin and its twenty 
years of sustained cooperation highlights that institutions play a pivotal role in cooperative relations 
between states and the harmonisation of national policies as they act as information sharing and 
policy coordination bodies.  
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Political will for cooperation over the Okavango River Basin  
In addition the establishment of OKACOM as a RBO has fostered high levels of mutual trust between 
riparian countries, which has certainly been a key factor in continued cooperative relations. 
Although an abstract concept, interviews with major stakeholders in OKACOM suggested that 
OKACOM’s milestone of twenty years would not have been possible without significant levels of 
trust between Angola, Botswana and Namibia163. Developing on the concept of trust is that of 
political will. In the case of the Nile River Basin, where overarching cooperation has yet to be 
achieved, tensions have arisen between some of the ten riparian states. It would seem that the main 
reason for a lack of cooperation stems from these states’ unwillingness to relinquish some degree of 
their sovereignty for cooperation and coordination over this trans-boundary water system.  
Regional institutions for cooperation over the Okavango River Basin 
Externally OKACOM’s ambition to foster cooperation is further reinforced on a regional level by the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and their Protocol on Shared Water Courses 
(PSWS) which was ratified in 1995 by all fourteen SADC member states.  SADC’s PSWS has created a 
vital institutional framework which enables “co-ordinated cooperation in the management and 
utilisation of shared watercourses and to advance the SADC agenda of regional integration and 
poverty alleviation”164. In addition, the PSWS has also identified several important principles to be 
adhered to by member states. These principles include:  
“…respect for the sovereignty of member states in their respective usage of shared water bodies; 
compliance to rules of general or customary international law, community of interest, and equitable 
utilisation; the need to ensure the balance between economic development and environmental 
protection in trans-boundary water sources; cooperation in projects and studies relevant to shared 
watercourse systems; commitment to sharing and proliferating data among riparian states; the 
equitable and reasonable usage of shared watercourse systems; the requirement for discharge and 
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abstraction permits for all watercourse users; and the obligation to inform all riparian states in the 
case of water-related emergencies”165. 
 SADC’s regional intuitional framework for cooperation over trans-boundary water systems, while 
signed after the establishment of OKACOM has significantly helped to institutionalise and reinforce 
the necessity of the norm of cooperation, particularly within Southern Africa which houses the 
largest number of water stressed countries in the world.   
International and continental institutions for cooperation over the Okavango River Basin  
In addition to OKACOM's strong institutional framework, which is supported regionally by SADC's 
PSWS, cooperation over the Okavango River Basin is also fostered through international institutions 
frameworks. These include 1997 UN Convention on the law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, which serves as the only universal water treaty which provides guiding 
principles for governance over shared water courses over political boundaries, and includes the 
"equitable and reasonable utilization of international watercourses; the application of appropriate 
measures to prevent harm to other states sharing an international watercourses; and the principle 
of prior notification for planned measures"166. This international water treaty, although not legally 
binding has helped to inform regional and basin-level shared water management strategies and has 
reinforced and supported cooperation over the Okavango River Basin, as all three member states are 
UN signatories. 
Norms of water cooperation  
In addition to the strong regional regulatory framework provided by SADC, international conventions 
and norms that focus specifically on water cooperation have also been established which reinforce 
the importance of cooperation and harmonisation of national water management policies and 
provide further motivations for sustained cooperation. These international conventions are 
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extensive but the most notable include the United Nations Convention on Water, which declared 
2013 as the ‘International Year of Water Cooperation’; as well as the UN’s International Decade for 
Action ‘Water for Life’ project which began in 2005 and is set to end in 2015; along with World 
Water Day in 2009 which focused specifically on cooperation over shared water courses. These 
norms and conventions at an international level and through the advocacy of global leaders like Kofi 
Annan and Mikhail Gorbachev, have affirmed the importance of cooperation and its relevance in 
light of the global water crisis, subsequently supporting and enhancing cooperative efforts over river 
basins such as the Okavango River Basin.   
Along with these norms for cooperation over shared water courses, there also exist important 
environmental conventions which stress the importance of cooperation in the pursuit of broader 
sustainable environmental and conservation goals, which have served as important tools for 
cooperation over the Okavango River Basin. These include the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance, which strives to promote global awareness and cooperative efforts 
through the conservation of threatened wetland ecosystems, especially where these ecosystems 
support unusually large number of unique species or an unusually wide diversity of species167. In 
1996 the Okavango Delta was declared a Ramsar site. While this declaration is of specific relevance 
to the national conservation and water policies in Botswana, the specific requirements of the 
Ramsar convention necessitate that other riparian states become involved in conservation and wise 
use of the designated site168.  Whilst Namibia has become a signatory to the convention, 
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contributing 3% of water that flows in the Okavango Delta, Angola which contributes 94% of river 
inflows has yet to do so169.  
In addition to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Botswana, Namibia 
and Angola have all ratified the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD). This important 
convention, whilst preserving the importance of each state's sovereign right to exploit their natural 
resources in relation with national environmental policies, emphasizes states' responsibility to 
ensure that national activities do not cause environmental damage beyond political boundaries170. 
This convention commits signatories to cooperate with other member riparian states directly, or 
through international organisations on issues that extend beyond political borders and on issues of 
shared interest including the conservation and sustainable use of important biodiversity171. It also 
advises the use of environmental impact assessments in order to ensure that development 
initiatives will not have adverse effects on biodiversity172.  This convention can certainly be argued as 
having a significant effect on cooperation over the Okavango River Basin, as OKACOM has worked 
hard to establish environmental impact assessment mechanisms through EPSMO and the TDA to 
inform decisions undertaken and thereby facilitating cooperation through increased awareness and 
information sharing.  
The final environmental convention that has reinforced the norm of water cooperation specifically 
over the Okavango River Basin is that of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) ratified by all three riparian states.  The primary objective of this convention is not directly 
related to water consumption or cooperation, however, it plays a significant role in states where 
water scarcity is a major concern. The UNFCCC incentivizes member states to cooperate in order to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that seeks to advance sustainable 
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economic growth and development for all countries, particularly developing countries. It also strives 
to encourage sustainable management of water resources through cooperative efforts for 
conservation of important global ecosystems. Finally, this convention emphasizes the importance of 
integrating climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies within joint water resource 
management173. 
Coupled with a strong presence of regional and international legal frameworks for international 
cooperation over trans-boundary water sources, is the increasing emphasis on the norms of 
international cooperation that are becoming increasingly interwoven with the attainment of the 
2015 Millennium Development Goals which have the wise use of water and development for water 
sanitation and basic needs at the centre of a number of its goals.  
The wide range of international norms and conventions that promote water cooperation, of which 
Botswana, Angola and Namibia are all member states, can be seen as an important driver of 
cooperation and has certainly helped to support cooperative efforts between these riparian states 
over the Okavango River Basin.  
Drawing Conclusions  
After an analysis of all drivers of cooperation it is perhaps most obvious that the institutionalisation 
of water cooperation over the Okavango River Basin through OKACOM,  with support from regional 
and international institutional frameworks for water cooperation, has been the most prominent 
driver of cooperation in this case study. This is on the basis that these institutions act as information-
sharing platforms in which coordinated policies can be created, in turn establishing political trust 
between riparian states and enhancing cooperative relations over the basin. While benefit-sharing 
mechanisms (through basin-wide tourism initiatives for example)  have yet to be established, which 
would further reinforce cooperation among riparian states over the Okavango River Basin, 
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OKACOM's twenty years of cooperation has highlighted the importance of institutions and 
institutional frameworks as drivers of cooperation.  
The second most important driver of cooperation in the case of the Okavango River Basin is that of 
international norms and conventions, to which Angola, Namibia and Botswana are all signatories. 
These norms and conventions have either directly or indirectly emphasized the importance of water 
cooperation for the attainment of a number of other global development and environmental goals 
and in turn have provided a positive reinforcement for cooperation over the Okavango River Basin.  
Finally, regional and basin-wide development initiatives can be seen as the third driver of 
cooperation in the Okavango Delta. Through development initiatives that directly or indirectly 
pertain to the river basin, cooperative relations are fostered and enhanced. However, development 
functionalism as a driver for cooperation in this specific case is limited in that there has been 
national development policies have not been fully integrated and coordinated, especially as the 






5. Conclusion  
This dissertation has sought to highlight the drivers of cooperation in the case of the Okavango River 
Basin between its three riparian states: Angola, Namibia and Botswana. Through an exploration of 
concepts and themes this dissertation has reinforced the now conventional wisdom that trans-
boundary water courses are perhaps more a catalyst for cooperation as opposed to conflict. In 
addition this dissertation, in outlining the hydro-political context of Southern Africa, sought to 
underscore the importance of trans-boundary water cooperation in the region especially as 
pressures from climate variability and population growth, resulting in increased demand for food, 
water and energy, become increasingly pressing issues. This informed the reason for seeking to 
analyse the drivers of cooperation in the case of the Okavango River Basin.  
In gaining a general understanding of theories surrounding cooperation over shared water courses in 
general, this dissertation highlighted three main drivers of cooperation: namely regional 
development functionalism; neoliberal institutionalism; and norms and conventions within a 
constructivist approach. Through an application of these drivers of cooperation to the case of 
cooperative efforts between riparian states over the basin, it was found that the most significant 
driver of cooperation is the institutionalisation of cooperation found in water regimes and RBOs, like 
OKACOM, and at a regional and international level through SADC's PSWS and the UN Convention on 
the law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Institutions like OKACOM are 
especially important as they act as information-sharing platforms which enable political trust to 
develop between member states, in turn facilitating the harmonisation of national policies and 




Closely following the institutionalisation of water cooperation, are the increasingly prominent norms 
and conventions that directly and indirectly encourage water cooperation over trans-boundary 
waters and have been specifically influential in the case of the Okavango River Basin.  
Finally, this dissertation noted the importance of regional development integration, which while 
slightly limited in its influence, still remains an important driver of cooperation, as states seek to 
develop both at a social and economic level, and given the dominance of shared resources in the 
region, further reinforces cooperative relations between riparian states of the Okavango River Basin.  
In light of the pressing challenges of water scarcity that have arisen with pressures from climate 
change and population growth, it is important when moving forward to acknowledge these 
important drivers of cooperation in order to create cooperative efforts over trans-boundary waters 
where they have yet to be established, as well as to further enhance already-established cooperative 
international water relations. In the case of the Okavango River Basin, in order to ensure that 
cooperation is sustained, OKACOM should consider the following recommendations, as previously 
highlighted in this dissertation:  
 OKACOM should incorporate a cross-sectoral approach in the management of the Okavango 
River Basin, integrating land-use planning and other national sectors (e.g. mining) and 
engaging with all relevant stakeholders at a local, national and regional level.  
 In addition OKACOM should consider a ‘Payment for Ecosystem Service’ and/or a financial 
benefit-sharing mechanism to offer incentives to upstream countries to refrain from 
implementing potentially destructive developments. This could include a regional tourism 
and wildlife plan for the basin.  
 EWA mechanisms should also be implemented to account for the abstractions, costs and 
benefits of water use in the basin and to ensure that abstractions do not compromise the 




 Finally, with the increase in water variability forecast by climate change scenarios, OKACOM 
should strive to integrate climate adaptation policies into its basin-wide strategy to ensure 
that hydrological balance of the river basin is not disturbed.  
While there may be room for improvement to enhance cooperation over the Okavango River Basin, 
this case study of cooperation and joint management of a trans-boundary water course, provides an 
optimistic account of cooperative efforts that can be established over shared water courses. 
OKACOM provides a good model for cooperation and should be commended as a noteworthy 
example highlighting the importance of cooperation and the harmonisation of policies and the now 
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